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 Preface 
 
 
There is an art, it says, or rather, a knack to flying. 
    The knack lies in learning how to throw yourself at the ground and miss. 
    Pick a nice day, it suggests, and try it. 
    The first part is easy. 
    All it requires is simply the ability to throw yourself forward with all your weight, 
and willingness not to mind that it's going to hurt. 
    That is, it's going to hurt if you fail to miss the ground. 
    Most people fail to miss the ground, and if they are really trying properly, the 
likelihood is that they will fail to miss it fairly hard. 
    Clearly, it is this second part, the missing, which presents the difficulties.  
- Douglas Adams 
from  The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 The Problem of Crew Safety 
Human space travel is an inherently risky prospect, one with little room for error.  
From its first human mission the United States (US) has sought not only to minimize that 
risk with stringent safety requirements, but also to offer the possibility of astronaut 
escape in at least some portions of the mission.  However, the only way to ensure the 
complete safety of an astronaut is to never launch a mission.  
The design problem simply stated is to provide the highest crew safety attainable at a minimum expense of 
weight, volume, and complexity on the space vehicle design. [1]  
In the initial years of the space program, when all the technology in use was new and 
relatively untested, a large amount of thought and effort was put into astronaut escape 
methods.  As the technology, and the confidence level in it, improved less thought was 
put into escape from the vehicle and more into the reliability of the vehicle itself, until in 
the current vehicle designs there are few or no options for an escape from the vehicle 
should something go drastically wrong.  However, with a new vehicle in the preliminary 
design phase, and the memory of the most recent space accident still fresh, the ideas for 
emergency escape from a vehicle are resurfacing. 
Ideas for escaping from a doomed vehicle go back to the beginning of the space program.  
Wernher Von Braun sketched out his concept of an emergency escape system even 
before the first space vehicle had been designed. (figure 2.1) [2].  The Mercury capsules 
were equipped with emergency escape rockets to pull the capsule off the launch vehicle 
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 in case of rocket failure on liftoff (figure 2.2).  In the early 1960’s General Electric 
developed the MOOSE escape system (figure 2.3) as an emergency escape for a singular 
astronaut from orbit [3], and on the International Space Station, the number of permanent 
astronauts is limited by the capacity of the Soyuz vehicle on board, so that in the event of 
a catastrophic emergency all astronauts aboard will have a means for leaving the station.  
With the shuttle system the United States shifted its focus from systems of escape, to 
system reliability.  However, the tragedies of two lost shuttles have proved that this 
method, while necessary, is not sufficient.  
 While it is only mildly difficult to build escape capacity into some parts of the 
mission cycle, allowing for escape throughout the mission is a much more difficult 
problem.  The extreme temperatures, accelerations and turbulence seen during the 
harshest periods of a launch or reentry trajectory make for a much more difficult problem 
than the relative calm of orbit or the final subsonic stages of reentry.  In addition, the 
characteristics that would make an escape vehicle ideal in one stage of the mission might 
be detrimental in another.  A major part of solving this problem is coming up with the 
characteristics that would allow for a successful compromise between all the mission 
stages. 
 While it is unlikely that the United States’ current human rated vehicle, the space 
shuttle, can be retrofitted to allow for an emergency escape, a new system is in the design 
process and will most likely be required to allow for that option for at least some portions 
of the mission.  What, to this date, has not been studied is whether the harsh conditions 
seen on launch, and even more so on entry, would allow such a system to be designed to 
work at all points in the mission. 
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1.2 Thesis Objective 
This thesis will present the results of an analytical study into the feasibility of a 
lifeboat style escape vehicle throughout an orbital mission.   The study simulated a 
lifeboat escaping from a shuttle-like trajectory.  Escape trajectories were plotted on a near 
continuous basis, with key conditions noted in each case.  Results of this study will be 
discussed in chapter 5 along with the feasibility of building lifeboat capabilities into a 
design for lifting space vehicles.    Figure 1.1 shows a conceptual lifeboat escape 
sequence. 
 
3
2
1
 
Figure 1.1  Conceptual Escape Sequence.  1.  Lifeboat begins attached to nominal vehicle.  2. 
Lifeboat ejects from nominal Vehicle during emergency.  3.  Lifeboat deploys heatshield to continue 
reentry away from doomed nominal vehicle 
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 Chapter 2: Historical Mission Contingency Designs 
 
 
2.1 Conceptual Escape Options 
 The space race began when rockets were still a very new and unstable technology, 
and that was the best understood part of a space mission.  It was well understood that 
spaceflight would be a dangerous prospect, and that in case of emergencies rescue would 
be very difficult if not impossible.  To alleviate these hazards much thought has gone into 
which portions of a mission are most dangerous, and how these dangers can be averted. 
The least reliable portion of any space mission, especially in the early years of the 
space program, is the launch itself, due to unreliability in the launch vehicles.  Therefore 
most proposed and enacted escape designs were for the periods before separation from 
the launch vehicle.  In general these designs are referred to as the Launch Abort System 
(LAS).  Within that period, three problem periods were pinpointed: liftoff, transonic 
through maximum dynamic pressure, and shutdown and staging.  Within these periods, 
the various failures that could occur could give the astronauts warnings ranging from less 
then half a second up to ten or more seconds [1].  In addition, when emergencies involve 
the launch vehicle there is a large chance that an explosion may occur.  In cases of 
explosion there are extra hazards that must be dealt with.  The first is the shock wave, 
which can be fatal to both astronaut and craft.  Acceptable shock wave levels were set at 
below 15 psi for .1 second for astronaut survival, and below 5 psi for .1 second for 
eardrum rupture [1].  Other hazards from explosions include fireballs, shrapnel, and 
thermal radiation.  All of these hazards occur in the first few seconds after the explosion, 
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 with their danger levels dropping quickly after an initial time period and distance has 
been put between the incident and the escape craft [1].  The duration and distance 
required, however, depends uniquely on the type of launch vehicle and fuel being used.  
In addition the maximum acceptable acceleration pulse is set at 20 g’s, with maximum 
sustained acceleration of 10 g’s [3]. 
 An aspect of the assumption that the least reliable portion of the craft was the 
launch vehicle, is that all designs involved simply separating the crew capsule from the 
launch vehicle.  While this has and will save lives, it leaves few options if the 
malfunction is not with the launch vehicle, as has happened several times in both the US 
and Russian space programs.   
The one exception to the stay with the ship mentality was a purely theoretical 
design.  In 1952, years before the advent of NASA’s Project Mercury, Wernher von 
Braun proposed a system to allow astronauts to escape from a doomed vehicle during the 
launch phase.  The system consisted of a series of individual capsules that could eject 
from the bottom of the vehicle, dropping the inhabitants towards the ground where they 
would be slowed by a parachute and a small solid rocket before landing.  A radar beacon 
would then activate to allow the survivors to be picked up by rescuers.  The capsules 
were to be pressurized, with the ability to perform basic life support tasks such as CO2 
scrubbing and temperature control (figure 2.1) [2].  Von Braun’s concept was for a large 
lifting vehicle.  When small ballistic capsules were decided on as the mechanism for 
America’s first ventures into space, it was decided that it was much safer to leave the 
astronauts in their spacecraft.     
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 In 1958, while working on Project Mercury, Maxime Faget came up with the 
concept of the Escape Tower Abort System.  The idea was that in case of a launch abort 
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 Figure 2.1  Werner Von Braun's Astronaut Escape Concept, circa 1952 mall, powerful solid rocket (figure 2.2) would quickly pull the Mercury capsule 
 from the volatile booster with a twenty-g acceleration burst.  The capsule could 
 renter normally, parachuting itself and the astronauts aboard it to safety.  This 
ept was used with some modification in the American Mercury and Apollo programs 
copied by the Russians for use on their own systems.  While the American version 
never tested, the Russian version succeeded in saving the lives of two cosmonauts in 
 [4]. 
Instead of an escape tower, the Gemini vehicles were equipped with ejection seats 
could be used in the first minute of launch before the speed becomes too great.  In 
ase of emergencies after this point the Gemini craft would fire its retrorockets to 
rate it from the booster and then open the main parachutes for the return to Earth.  An 
tional change in the Gemini configuration was that a human override was introduced 
the system.  In the Mercury system, if impending vehicle failure was sensed the abort 
al was automatically given, firing the escape tower.  Because the fuel in the Titan 
6 
 rocket was less explosive and abort 
decisions would have to be made on the 
order of seconds rather then microseconds, 
it was decided to give the crew the final 
abort decision.  In Gemini, potential 
failures were displayed to the crew at 
which point they had to initiate an abort.  
This allowed for a human override in 
situations where those on board might 
have the best idea of what conditions 
actually existed.  The Apollo escape system was between these two designs.  In cases of 
immediate impending doom an automatic abort would launch the capsule away from the 
launch vehicle.  In case of less dire emergencies, the decision to abort was left to the 
astronauts [5]. 
Figure 2.2   Mercury Capsule with Launch 
Escape Tower 
During the Apollo era there were also plans for rescuing an astronaut from orbit, though 
none of them got much past the development stage.  Most were based on similar design 
concepts, and the best developed and most famous of these was the General Electric 
Manned Orbital Operations Safety Equipment (MOOSE) Program (figure 2.3).  The idea 
was that a pressure-suited astronaut could strap the MOOSE system to his back, jump out 
of his spacecraft and safely reenter to Earth.  MOOSE consisted of a folded heat shield, a 
canister of polyurethane foam, a chest mounted parachute, and a handheld retro motor.  
After bailing out the astronaut was to pull the deployment cord which expanded the heat 
shield and encase him in form fitting foam.  The astronaut would then hand aim and fire 
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 the retrorocket.  After a ballistic reentry 
he would pull the rip cord and parachute 
in for a landing.  The system was 
remarkably light, weighing in at about 
215 kilograms including the astronaut 
[3]. 
 During this same period an orbital 
escape vehicle was being developed by 
the airforce based around the concept of 
an inflatable reentry paraglider that had 
been used in a suborbital 
micrometeoroid experiment.  The idea 
was to attach the folded lifeboat to the 
outside of a spacestation.  Upon abandoning
small pod while the wing of his vehicle was
Once inflated, retrorockets could be fired b
Once into the atmosphere the vehicle could
advantage of this style vehicle was that it al
However, after it became apparent that no s
vehicle would not be able to fit in an Apollo
up [6]. 
 
With the advent of the shuttle era, and the s
the safety community shifted from bailout a
 
 Figure 2.3   MOOSE Escape System  the station an astronaut would crawl into a 
 inflated with nitrogen stored on the station.  
ringing the lifeboat into a reentry trajectory.  
 be steered using wing warping.  The 
lowed for a very large landing footprint.  
pace station would be built, and such a 
 sized capsule funding for the research dried 
uccess of the previous missions, the focus of 
nd rescue to reliability.  As shuttle plans 
8 
 became more all consuming of the US space community, all talk of bail options 
dwindled.  After the Challenger disaster, a special partial pressure suit, the Launch and 
Entry Suit (LES) was designed to protect astronauts from depressurization at high 
altitudes, and to provide survival gear and a parachute in case of the necessity of bailout.  
This was replaced in 1995 with the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), which was 
similar except that it is a full pressure suit.  It was decided that it was impractical to 
retrofit the shuttle with any other bailout options [3] [7]. 
 A last design that, 
while not directly relating to 
bailout or rescue, is important 
to this thesis is the Parashield 
design (figure 2.4) created by 
a group of MIT graduate 
students in 1988.  Parashield 
was an ultra light weight, 
very low ballistic coefficient, 
reentry vehicle.  The design 
was based on the theory that with a low enough ballistic coefficient a vehicle would slow 
down high enough in the atmosphere that only a very light weight heat shield would be 
required to protect the vehicle.  Since the heat shield is one of the heaviest parts of any 
reentry vehicle’s design, this allows for large amounts of mass to be cut from the design.  
A scale model was built and launch was attempted on an experimental rocket by the 
American Rocket Company (AMROC) in 1988.  The launch failed, but all research and 
Figure 2.4  Parashield, lightweight, low beta reentry design 
 9 
 
 simulations seem to indicate that the concepts Parashield was based on are sound.   Since 
in any lifeboat design weight is going to be a major driving factor, the concepts 
developed in Parashield are beneficial to keep in mind when working with lifeboat 
design.  
2.2 Mission Abort Modes 
Both the American and Soviet space programs have kept a long list of abort 
scenarios for each of their vehicle designs.  For all vehicles, these scenarios tend to fall 
into one of five categories; Abort to Orbit, Abort Once Around, Abort to Transatlantic 
Landing, Return to Launch Site, and Launch Escape Systems.  In general, any given 
vehicle has at least three of these options available in its design.  Below the four shuttle 
abort modes are described (figure 2.5).  The aborts were similar in previous US and 
soviet vehicles and those aborts are not specifically described.  The fifth and final 
developed abort mode explained below, a Launch Escape System, is not an available 
option on the US space shuttle.   
In any abort scenario there are several main points of damage that must be 
avoided.  The first, in the case of booster failures, is the product of any explosion that 
occurs, mainly fireballs, shockwaves and shrapnel.  The second main concern is the 
aerodynamic forces caused by the velocity and atmospheric density at which the vehicle 
is traveling.  In this case the higher in altitude that the abort occurs the easier the abort 
will be due to the decreased atmospheric density.   
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 2.2.1 Return to Launch Site Abort (RTSL) 
A Return to Launch Site Abort involves an abort very soon after launch.  In this 
case the orbiter flies downrange to dissipate propellant before returning to fly in under 
power for a landing at or near the launch site.   In a capsule style vehicle the abort mode 
is somewhat different.  In this case the capsule would detach from the booster at some 
point before normal main engine cutoff (MECO) and come down in its normal landing 
mode.   
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 Figure 2.5 Shuttle Intact Abort Modes [8]   
2.2.2 Transatlantic Abort Landing 
In a Transatlantic Abort Landing, the vehicle does not have the boost to maintain 
a stable orbit, or even a single orbit, but is too high at the time of the abort to return to the 
launch site.  Instead, the vehicle would take a suborbital trajectory and land some 
distance away.  In the US scenario this would be a landing site in Europe.  In the scenario 
developed by the former Soviet Union, the landing site was near the Chinese border.  In 
the space shuttle transatlantic abort scenario a ballistic entry is utilized, meaning that 
attitude control is not necessary during the landing so the orbital maneuvering system 
does not need to be functional for this abort to take place. 
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2.2.3 Abort Once Around  
In an Abort Once Around, the vehicle does not have enough boost to maintain a 
stable orbit, but instead orbits once before coming in for a normal landing.  In order for 
this option to be viable, the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) must still be 
functioning.  
 
2.2.4 Abort to Orbit  
In an Abort to Orbit scenario, either a booster failure occurs late in the launch or 
no outright failure occurs, but for some reason less thrust is obtained than was expected.  
In this case, the vehicle obtains a lower orbit than was expected.  At this point mission 
control has time to investigate the failure and can attempt to characterize its nature and 
severity before either attempting to boost the vehicle to its proper orbit or bringing it 
down for an early landing.  
 
2.2.5 Launch Escape Systems 
The last intact abort option, not available on the space shuttle, but used in almost 
every capsule style vehicle flown is the Launch Escape System.  This option is intended 
for use in the seconds leading up to and directly after engine ignition.  Should a failure 
occur in the engine immediately around launch this system is designed to pull the 
occupied capsule away from the booster as quickly as possible so that, should the booster 
explode, the occupied capsule would not be caught in the explosion.  In general this has 
been accomplished with a very short duration high thrust rocket burn.  The capsules are 
generally separated from the boosters at close to 20 g’s of acceleration.  The system was 
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 designed to give the capsule enough altitude to not only remove it from the shockwave 
and debris of an exploded booster, but also that the parachutes could be safely deployed 
to bring it back for a landing. [9] 
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 Chapter 3: Historical Incidents 
 
3.1 Historical Emergency Procedures 
Unfortunately a true test of any emergency procedure cannot occur until there is 
an actual emergency.  The individual systems can be tested, as well as how the system 
functions as a whole, but until the system has been seen in action it is difficult to predict 
exactly how well it will function as a whole.  Also it is a truism that the biggest challenge 
that will be faced is the one that cannot be planned for.  In the almost fifty year history of 
the manned space travel, about one third of the missions have had some kind of anomaly 
[3].  One crew was rescued by a launch bailout system, four crews have perished, and 
several others were in situations that could have proved fatal.  Not every tragedy could 
have been averted with a lifeboat system, such as the one being suggested in this thesis, 
and not every anomaly results in the loss of ship or crew.  Below several situations are 
described, along with an analysis of what emergency procedures were in place and what 
additional emergency facilities could have been utilized.  Special emphasis is placed on 
whether some form of escape vehicle would have been useful in these situations.   
3.2 Mercury MA-6 
On February 20, 1962, after a month of delays, John Glenn launched in 
Friendship 7 for the United States’ first manned orbital mission.  During the first orbit a 
bent shaft on one of the rotary limit switches moved and broke an electrical contact 
leading to warning signals being transmitted to Mission Control that the heat shield had 
become detached from the spacecraft and was only being held on by the three titanium 
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 straps that attached the retrorocket for reentry [10].  While trying to ascertain if they were 
getting a true reading, and while trying to come up with a contingency plan it was 
decided to keep Glenn in the dark about the situation.   
After conferring with the spacecraft and heat shield designers it was decided that 
Glenn should reenter with the retrograde package still attached and hope that if the heat 
shield was actually loose the straps would hold it in place until air pressure became 
sufficient to do the job.  However, should the retrorockets not fire completely they would 
have to be jettisoned to avoid the chance of a fireball as propellant in the tanks caught 
fire.   
As the mission continued experts on the ground debated the likelihood of a faulty 
signal, with instructions to Glenn about reentering with the retrograde package 
fluctuating as he passed over various control stations.  Eventually it was decided to enter 
without jettisoning the retrograde package.  The pack burned through partway through 
reentry, causing straps to flop over the window, and chunks of the retrograde package to 
go flying past the window. 
This early in the history of manned space it was unlikely that any kind of escape 
vehicle could have been successfully incorporated, as the technology was barely at a high 
enough level for the systems that were built.  What this incident shows however is how 
early on the dangers of unexpected problems occurring in orbit became apparent, and 
how much these could effect the reentry process.  Also apparent was that due to the 
distance and environment, there is room for a lot of uncertainty over what exactly and 
how serious the malfunction is.  The information available on the status of the craft is 
only as good as the sensors reporting it.  Sensor malfunctions can add serious hazard to 
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 the crew, as they may cause emergency procedures to be enacted when there is no actual 
emergency.  Glenn was in a perfectly functional craft, but because of a malfunctioning 
sensor he was forced to deviate from standard reentry procedures.  
 
3.3 Gemini 6 
On the morning of December 15th 1965 Walter Schirra and Thomas Stafford were 
to launch in Gemini 6 on a mission to come within docking distance with the crew of 
Gemini 7 already in orbit.  At launch a plug fell out of the tail of the Titan rocket 
activating a cockpit clock that was not supposed to start until liftoff.  The malfunction 
detection system on the Titan rocket caused the burn to shut down after 1.2 seconds due 
to the lack of upward motion.  By mission regulations the astronauts aboard should have 
ejected from the capsule at this point since if the vehicle had moved even a centimeter it 
would have collapsed back on the pad and exploded.  However Schirra, the commander 
for the mission, in a split second decision decided that there had been no motion and 
therefore the booster would not settle back on the pad and explode.  His instincts told him 
that at that moment it was safer to remain with the craft.  Schirra’s decision saved the 
mission, and also himself and his crewmate some probably injury.  It also allowed the 
launch to be rescheduled in 3 days, and the docking to be successfully completed, even if 
at the moment his only motivation was that he believed it safer to stay with the ship[11] 
[12] [13]. 
What this incident tells us is the value of allowing the human decision into the 
abort process whenever possible.  Had the abort been in the automatic control of the 
computer, or even under the command of mission control as in the Russian system, the 
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 mission would have been a failure.  The use of the launch escape system in this situation 
would have been riskier for the crew, and destroyed the crew capsule.  Allowing the 
experience and senses of the astronauts aboard to make the final decision saved the 
mission.   
This is not the case in all launch emergencies.  In at least some cases the danger is 
beyond human reaction time and a computer must be allowed to control the abort.  
However when the emergency allows for enough time, there seems to be value in 
allowing human judgment to make the final abort call.   
 
3.4 Gemini 8 
Neal Armstrong and David Scott launched in Gemini 8 on March 16, 1966.  Their 
mission was to dock with the Agena target vehicle already in orbit.  The docking was 
accomplished uneventfully about 6 ½ hours after launch.  When the crew began trying to 
maneuver the combined vehicles they went into a spin.  Thinking the error was in the 
target vehicle they separated, but this only caused the spin to get worse.  At its worst the 
spin was end over end at about one revolution a second, enough to cause dizziness and 
bring the crew close to blackout.   
After disengaging the Orbital Attitude Maneuvering System (OAMS), Armstrong 
and Scott checked that the Reentry Control System (RCS) was still functioning.  They 
then turned on the OAMS thrusters one at a time, finally determining that thruster 
number 8 had failed ‘on’ such that it was continuously firing.  Armstrong then used the 
thrusters in the RCS system to stabilize the craft.  Emergency use of RCS thrusters meant 
that the mission had to be terminated early, since if any further thrusters failed the crew 
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 could be stranded in orbit.  Gemini 8 splashed down in a contingency landing site in the 
Pacific southeast of Okinawa 10 hours and 41 minutes after it launched [11] [12] [13]. 
This incident was the first serious orbital emergency encountered by the United 
States, and in its initial onset, similar to the incident that would cause the loss of Soyuz 1 
in the next year.  This incident proved the usefulness of having redundant systems.  Had 
the crew not had the fully independent RCS system available to them the outcome could 
have been much different.  The ability to turn off the OMS ring and use the completely 
separate system allowed them to bring the vehicle under control, and prevent the mission 
from ending with fatalities. 
  Had they not been able to bring the craft under control with the RCS or had the 
RCS failed to respond there may have been no way to bring the craft back safely.  Had 
that been the case, some form of orbital escape system may have been of value, assuming 
it had the necessary thrusters available to stabilize the spin.  As it was the availability of 
the redundant attitude control system in the RCS saved the crew and the craft even 
though the remainder of the mission had to be aborted.   
 
 
3.5 Soyuz 1 
Soyuz 1 was launched on April 23, 1967, piloted by Vladmir Komarov.  A second 
Soyuz vehicle was expected to launch later that day, but the fact that it did not suggests 
that the Soviets knew of difficulties with the mission early on.  While the exact failure 
was never released, it is suspected that one of the solar arrays failed to deploy properly, 
leaving one of the ship’s radiators covered thus preventing the heat generated by the 
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 ship’s electronics from dissipating as planned.  This appears to have led to the failure of 
the attitude control system, causing the ship to tumble end over end.  During the 17th 
orbit, Komarov put the vehicle into a spin to attempt to keep it stable during the reentry 
burn.  During the 18th orbit the retro rockets were fired putting the capsule on a ballistic 
trajectory.  The resulting entry would have encountered very high g accelerations and left 
the vehicle short of the normal landing zone.   
 As the vehicle was reentering the main parachute deployed, but because of 
the tumbling and rotating of the capsule its straps became tangled.  Komarov then tried to 
deploy the backup parachute, which became entangled in the main chute.  While the other 
failures contributed to the situation it was this final failure that proved fatal, as the 
capsule hit the ground at an estimated speed of 500 miles per hour [4].  
 It is not apparent whether a lifeboat would have been appropriate in this 
case.  While the ability to eject may have saved Komarov it appears that a reasonable 
number of backup procedures were already in place.  Based on what is known of the 
failures a lifeboat ejection could have been attempted at two places.  Had there been a 
lifeboat available it is possible that Komarov could have ejected in orbit before 
attempting reentry in a vehicle with no attitude control.  However at that point since the 
majority of systems required for landing were intact it is likely that Komarov would still 
have attempted reentry with the ship.  The second point at which an ejection would have 
been likely was after the backup parachute failed to deploy, however by this point that 
seems like almost an excessive level of backup procedures.  It appears in this case, that 
rather then a full lifeboat a redundant attitude control system would have been a much 
more efficient and economic infrastructure investment.      
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3.6 Soyuz 5 
On January 15, 1969 Soyuz 5 launched, a day after Soyuz 4, on a mission for the 
first Soviet docking of piloted vehicles.  The crew on this mission, Boris Volynov, 
Yevgeniy Khrunov and Aleksey Yeliseyev, flew up to meet Vladimir Shatalov.  These 
missions represented the first Soviet manned space effort since the Soyuz 1 failures 
almost 2 years earlier.  The mission proceeded as planned with the vehicles performing a 
hard dock, and two of the crew members, Khrunov and Yeliseyev, performed and EVA 
transfer to Soyuz 4 leaving Volynov alone in the Soyuz 5 capsule.  Soyuz 4 then 
reentered first landing on January 17, on target in Kazakhstan. 
At 10:20 the next morning Volynov began his reentry with his retroburn.  After 
this the three sections of the spacecraft were supposed to separate leaving the entry 
module unencumbered for the return trip.  However, when Volynov looked out the 
window he could see the solar panels of the service module still attached.  At this point 
there was nothing Volynov or the ground control could do, and as the combined modules 
began tumbling into the atmosphere everyone, including Volynov, was convinced that he 
would not survive the entry.   
Because of the attached service module the heat shield was not taking the brunt of 
the heat exposure, causing the crew cabin to begin to fill with smoke as insulation began 
burning.  At this point in the entry attitude control jets were supposed to fire to steady the 
vehicle, however all the fuel had been spent during the initial burn in an unsuccessful 
attempt to adjust the attitude of the combined modules.  Finally the intense heat caused 
 21 
 
 the hydrogen peroxide tanks to explode.  The force of the explosion was enough to force 
the crew hatch inwards, but it also finally blew off the service module.   
Volynov then had a second scare when, after the main parachute deployed, its 
straps began to twist.  Once again there was nothing anyone could do but wait and hope. 
The straps eventually untwisted allowing the chute to slow the capsule enough that the 
soft landing engines were able to slow the vehicle enough for a survivable landing.   
Volynov survived the landing with injuries to his upper jaw, but no broken bones or other 
major injuries[4] [14]. 
This situation would have warranted a lifeboat ejection had one been available.  
From the moment Volynov realized the service module had failed to separate there was 
no question that the entry was going to be hazardous and very likely fatal.  Had the 
Hydrogen Peroxide tanks blown a few seconds later the capsule would likely have burned 
through and survival would have been impossible.  While a combination of luck and 
good design of the Soyuz craft saved Volynov’s life, an emergency lifeboat ejection 
would likely have been less hazardous.   
 
 3.7 Soyuz 11 
On June 6, 1971 Soyuz 11 was launched on a mission to the Salyut 1 Space 
Station.  The setup for this capsule allowed for a three man crew, however the volume 
was to small too allow them to wear pressure suits.  After a nominal month long mission 
the crew mothballed the station and prepared to reenter in their Soyuz capsule.  This 
version of Soyuz was designed with twelve retrorockets meant to fire sequentially upon 
reentry.  In this case they fired simultaneously, causing, a seal on the capsules pressure 
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 equalization valve to open.  This valve is only supposed to be opened at low altitude 
when there is a breathable amount of air.  The cabin lost all atmosphere in approximately 
30 seconds at an altitude of approximately 168 km, killing the crew.   
While there was a manual shutoff for this valve the procedure to enact it took over 
a minute, giving the crew no chance of survival.  The crew could have been saved if they 
were provided with pressure suits for the reentry portion of the flight, a protocol that 
became standard procedure after this flight.  This was the last three man crew launched 
until a new Soyuz design was produced with enough volume for a three man crew to 
launch while wearing pressure suits [4].  
In the final analysis, this situation would not have warranted a lifeboat ejection, 
however the ability to retreat to a separately pressurized lifeboat compartment, even if the 
ejection was not completed, would have been valuable.  A pressurized lifeboat may be a 
solution to time critical life support emergencies, as well as situations of full vehicle 
failure.  In this case the cosmonauts could have lived off a lifeboat life support system for 
the duration of the entry.  The only other mission wide option for life support failures is 
backup pressure suits for every astronaut.  There, however, are heavy, and difficult to don 
quickly.  An easily sealed section of the vehicle or lifeboat with a separate short term life 
support system might provide an extra level of security to the crew throughout the 
mission.  Should the problem be solved they could reenter the main vehicle.  Should the 
situation continue they could eject without having to come back into contact with the 
contaminated system. 
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 3.8 Soyuz 18 
Launched on April 5, 1975, the mission was intended to dock at the Salyut 4 
Space Station.  During launch there was a malfunction in the A-2 booster where a 
sequencer relay prematurely fired two of the four pyrotechnic latches that held the core 
stage to the upper stage.  This also disabled the remaining two latches so that the core 
stage could not be detached after shutdown causing the upper stage to begin firing while 
the core was still attached finally resulting in the launch trajectory begining to deviate.  
When the flight path deviated 10 degrees from the nominal the Launch Abort System 
automatically activated.   
The Launch Abort System functioned nominally, shutting down the upper stage 
and separating the spacecraft from the booster.  After separation, which occurred at 180 
km and a velocity of approximately 5.5 km/s, the spacecraft reoriented for reentry and 
proceeded to retroburn into a ballistic reentry trajectory.  The cosmonauts saw as much as 
20 g’s during their reentry and had absolutely no control over the system.  They landed 
close to the Chinese border and were located within a few hours.   
This system was the Soviet equivalent of a U.S. Space Shuttle abort to 
Transatlantic Landing [8] or a Gemini retro-rocket abort [1].  The error occurred late 
enough in the launch that the vehicle was already at close to orbital velocities.  In 
addition the abort took place above the thickest part of the atmosphere.  Thus the capsule 
did not have to worry about aerodynamic forces during the crucial time while it was 
reorienting for landing.       
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 3.9 Soyuz T-10A 
On September 26, 1983 the Soyuz T-10 mission was scheduled to launch for the 
Salyut 7 Space Station.  Ninety seconds before liftoff a malfunction allowed fuel to spill 
out around the base of the booster.  With less then a minute left before launch the spilled 
fuel caught fire causing ground control to trigger an abort.  Unfortunately the 
communication lines to the capsule had already burned through and the command was 
not transmitted.  The command was resent twenty seconds later over the backup radio 
system causing the Launch Escape System solid rocket motors to ignite.  Unlike in the 
NASA system, the Soviet system did not allow the cosmonauts to independently activate 
the abort system from the capsule.  The boosters exploded on the launch pad six seconds 
after the system was activated. 
The escape rocket fired for five seconds pulling the cosmonauts away from the 
booster at a 17 g acceleration.  After this smaller sustainer motors fired and air brakes 
deployed to keep the shroud vertical.  Pyrotechnics then fired to separate the capsule 
from the orbital module allowing the capsule to drop out of the launch shroud.  This all 
occurred at approximately 650 meters altitude.  Once the capsule was out of the shroud 
the heat shield jettisoned and the emergency parachute opened bringing the capsule back 
to Earth close to the launch complex.  Both the cosmonauts were uninjured though 
understandably shaken [4]. 
This was the only live use of any of the any of the very similar launch escape 
systems used by both NASA and the Soviets.  The system functioned as planned pulling 
the crew away from the doomed boosters before a fatal explosion could occur.    
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 3.10 STS-51-F Challenger 
All of the above examples, both from the U.S. and the Soviets, have been in 
capsule style vehicles.  In 1982 the U.S. began launching manned missions solely on the 
new space shuttle.  Unlike its predecessors this was a winged vehicle, which while 
launching in a similar fashion to previous vehicles, reentered on a much different and 
more complex, trajectory then had been used before.  The first abort situation with this 
new vehicle occurred during the ascent portion of its 15th mission that launched on July 
29, 1985.   
The mission, commanded by Gordon Fullerton with Roy Bridges Jr. as pilot, 
launched normally.  However, after the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) were jettisoned the 
center engine sensors showed the engine beginning to overheat.  Flight controllers 
initially throttled that engine back to 65%, and T+645 seconds after launch, when the 
engine continued to overheat, the General Purpose Computer (GPC) automatically shut 
that engine off.  By this point of the ascent the shuttle had sufficient altitude to achieve an 
abort to orbit with only two engines.  Fullerton was told to turn the abort switch to 
“ATO” which throttled the remaining two engines up to 91% for 70 seconds to 
compensate for the lost engine.  At this point however, one of the remaining engines 
began to report a temperature rise.  With two engines out the shuttle would be forced to 
attempt a riskier TAL abort.  However, with this second anomaly, flight controllers began 
suspecting a faulty sensor, and recommended that the crew override the GPC and keep 
the second engine from shutting down.   
The shuttle initally obtained a 120 km orbit, which was later raised to 275 km 
using the maneuvering system.  While not ideal for the mission that had been planned this 
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 orbit was better then a full abort and modifications to the mission objectives were made.  
The rest of the mission was uneventful and Challenger landed at Edwards Airforce Base 
in California on August 6.  After landing, the engines were examined and it was 
determined that problem was indeed with the sensors and not the engines.   
This abort marks the second time in the US space program when faulty sensors 
almost caused disaster.  Unlike in the Mercury mission, in this case contingency plans 
were in place and functioned as planned, however in both cases emergency procedures 
were enacted unnecessarily because of faulty readings.  Though nothing was truly wrong 
with the craft, the crew was put in unnecessary danger because of faulty information.  
While the abort plans worked perfectly in this case they were detrimental to the mission 
and the overall safety of the crew.  The better option would be to have redundant sensors 
or a way of testing the validity of the sensor readings [7] [15]. 
 
 
3.11 STS-51-L Challenger 
On January 28, 1986 mission STS-51-L of the Challenger Space Shuttle was lost 
73 seconds after launch when the shuttle broke up due to an O-ring failure in the solid 
rocket moter.  The report released six months after the accident concluded that the forces 
to which the crew were subjected were probably not enough to kill them, or even to cause 
serious injury.  It is hypothesized based on photographs and the last milliseconds of data 
reported by the shuttle systems, that the orbiter breakup itself produced forces no worse 
then a gravity pulse of 20 g’s in the vertical axis lasting less then two seconds.  That at 
least some of the crew survived the initial breakup is supported by the fact that at least 
three of the Personal Egress Air Packs (PEAPs) were activated.  The PEAPs contained 
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 the emergency air supply for the crew, and had to be manually activated.  However, in 
the case of loss of pressure in the crew compartment the PEAPs would not have been 
enough to prevent a rapid loss of consciousness, though they probably would have 
prevented death.  What appears to have caused the deaths of the crew, that as the orbiter 
fell it collided with the ocean at a speed of 207 miles per hour (333 km/hour) [16]. 
The Challenger accident is the type of situation for which the Launch Escape 
Systems had been designed.  Had the crew been able to separate from the doomed vehicle 
they would have likely survived the orbiter breakup and been able to return to Earth in a 
more controlled fashion.  However, because of the design of the orbiter, and the focus on 
reliability instead of escape, no such system was implemented on the shuttle.   
 
3.12 STS-107 Columbia 
On February 1, 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia was returning from a 17 day 
mission when it broke up due to a breach in the heat shield.  It is believed that the breach 
occurred on liftoff when a 0.76 kg piece of foam insulation separated from the external 
fuel tank and struck the orbiter wing at approximately 236 m/s.  The mission appeared 
nominal until after the orbiter had passed through the entry interface (EI), the transition 
point between orbital and atmospheric conditions, which occurs at 400,000 feet (122 km).  
270 seconds (4.5 minutes) after EI the first off nominal readings began to appear.  
Conditions quickly degraded as hot gas entered the structure of the wing.  The first sensor 
reading was lost at EI + 487 seconds (8.11 minutes) as the hot gasses melted the wiring 
bundles.  160 measurements failed in the two minutes following this.  The failing sensors 
were the first indications the crew would have had that something was wrong.   
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 As the structure of the wing weakened and deformed due to the influx of hot 
gasses, the orbiter attempted to veer from its planned trajectory.  Initially this was 
compensated for by the flight control system, with the only the vehicle sideslip, the angle 
between the relative wind direction and the velocity vector, exceeding what had been 
seen in previous flights.  During this same period temperature readings continued to rise 
and debris began to fall from the shuttle.  The first debris events were captured on video 
at EI + 577 seconds (9.6 minutes). 
Still, it is unknown at what point the crew of Columbia were aware that they were 
dealing with a fatal error.  The best indication is that at EI + 927 seconds (15.45 minutes) 
the orbiter’s attitude control was no longer able to counteract the increased lift and drag 
from the left wing, and the sign of the sideslip angle changed, indicating an imminent 
loss of vehicle control [17].  The main body of the orbiter did not begin to break up until 
EI + 972 seconds (16.2 minutes) [18], leaving at least 45 seconds in which action could 
have been taken had an escape vehicle been present.  Even had a lifeboat been available, 
the breakup occurred during some of the most intense moments of the entry.  A lifeboat 
would have had to eject into an incredibly difficult aerodynamic and thermal 
environment.   
 
 
3.13 Results of Historical Analysis 
The findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Synopsis 
report that ”By the time Mission Control received the data on the wing heating, the 
damage was unrecoverable” [19].  Columbia and the other missions discussed above 
show that as much planning and research as one may put into a mission there is always 
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 something unplanned for that can go wrong.  In many cases this problem may not even be 
recognized until it is too late.  Focusing almost exclusively on reliability issues as NASA 
has for the duration of the shuttle program is not necessarily the best approach.  While a 
high level of reliability is definitely necessary, it is not sufficient.  It is better to prevent 
an accident then to plan for dealing with one that has occurred, no amount of planning 
can account for all accidents.   
The board also found that  
Throughout its history, NASA has consistently struggled to achieve viable safety programs 
and adjust them to the constraints and vagaries of changing budgets. Yet, according to 
multiple high level independent reviews, NASA’s safety system has fallen short of the mark 
[19]. 
This rather damning review leads to the conclusion that safety will be an even greater 
focus on the next generation of manned space vehicles.   
The above missions also show two main periods of malfunction onsets.  The first, 
during the first minutes of launch, has been an acknowledged hazard period since the 
beginning of manned space travel.  When implemented the various LES and LAS 
systems have been very effective at preventing disasters during this period, saving the 
crew in 3 of the 4 times they have been needed, not counting abort to orbit situations. 
The second class of incidents are those that begin in orbit and are exacerbated 
during reentry.  Of these, when the incidents occurred in capsule style vehicles, in most 
cases, contingency plans were robust enough to secure a successful rescue.  The 
exception to this is Soyuz 1, where the issues overwhelmed the contingency plans, mostly 
due to the lack of redundancy in the attitude control system as evidenced by the earlier 
survival of the Gemini VIII crew.  In any case, in capsule style vehicles few new issues 
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 emerged during reentry that were not directly related to the issues already apparent in 
orbit.   
By contrast, while the damage that led to the loss of the Columbia orbiter 
occurred upon launch, the danger signs did not appear until well past entry interface.  
This meant that the anomalies encountered came as a complete surprise.  Also whereas 
reentry in a capsule style vehicle tends to be a fairly short and straightforward situation, 
in a shuttle style vehicle it is much longer and more complex.  In a capsule there is a 
limited amount of attitude control that needs to be accomplished once the vehicle is into 
the atmosphere.  In a shuttle style vehicle attitude control is constant and complex.  This 
makes them much more vulnerable  to late occurring anomalies, and makes those 
anomalies harder to deal with when they do occur.  
From these incidents it appears that a Launch Escape System is valuable in all 
cases, for all styles of spacecraft.  Booster errors occur fairly regularly, though often they 
are mild enough to either not seriously effect the mission, or at most require an abort to 
orbit.  Various launch abort scenarios for later occurring launch errors are also necessary, 
and in most cases appear to be well identified and operable.  By contrast, an Orbital 
Escape System could be valuable for all styles of craft, but in many cases can be done 
without so long as there is a sufficient level of redundancy, as in Gemini 8, and in a case 
of faulty sensors such as Mercury MA-6, might actually endanger the crew further.   
A lifeboat capable of ejecting throughout the full mission profile only appears 
necessary when dealing with a shuttle style craft.  The trajectory and controls in capsule 
style vehicles are simple enough that problems not already present on orbit do not tend to 
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 have time to propagate.  The exception to this is sudden life support problems which have 
other, lighter, solutions. 
 
Mission Year Incident Crew Lost 
Mercury MA-6 1962 Sensor failure indicating prematurely detached heat shield No 
Gemini 6  1965 Premature Booster Shutdown No 
Gemini 8  1966 ACS Failure No 
Soyuz 1  1967 ACS Failure Yes 
Soyuz 5  1969 Service Module Failed to Separate No 
Soyuz 11  1971 Sudden Decompression Yes 
Soyuz 18  1975 Faulty Booster No 
Soyuz T-10  1983 Booster Fire No 
STS-51-F  1985 Engine Failure due to sensor error No 
STS-51-L  1986 Booster Explosion Yes 
STS-107  2003 Heat Shield Failure Yes 
Table 3.1 Summary of Historical Emergency Incidents
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 Chapter 4: Simulation Design 
 
4.1 Simulation Focus 
The purpose of this thesis was to be an analysis of the likelihood of survival in 
an emergency escape from a spacecraft throughout its mission.  An analysis of all 
possible vehicles in all possible mission phases is too broad of a scope for this 
project, so the decision was made to limit it to reentry situations.  As described in 
chapter 2 there are several successful methods of launch aborts which have been 
demonstrated on both Soviet and American systems.  This experience base confirms 
that there are methods of rescuing crew from a variety of launch emergencies 
between liftoff and the attainment of the final mission orbit.   
Inside the scope of reentry, the decision was made to further focus on shuttle 
style  (high lift) vehicles.  High lift entries are generally more complex and stressful 
than a low-L/D capsule style entry.   If an escape is possible for the high lift case, it 
should also be possible for the simpler capsule style entry.   
4.2 Entry Conditions 
During descent in a reentry trajectory there are several regions of conditions 
experienced.  In each of these regions a drastically different environmental conditions 
are experienced.  Initially the vehicle is in the orbital conditions of microgravity and 
no distinguishable atmosphere.  As the descent begins the growing atmospheric 
density introduces drag, which slows the vehicle down, and introduces temperature, 
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 sensed acceleration and dynamic pressure increases.  Entry interface (EI) is defined as 
the point at which the acceleration due to drag is greater then 0.05 g’s, usually this 
occurs somewhere near 122 km above the surface [8].  
As the descent continues the intensity of the above mentioned environmental 
characteristics increases, until each peak separately at altitudes that differ depending 
on vehicle characteristics.  The point of peak dynamic pressure (Max Q) tends to be 
the benchmark point in this region of a reentry trajectory.  Shortly after the Max Q 
point the environmental intensity begins to dissipate until eventually the vehicle goes 
subsonic and final landing procedures can begin.   
As mentioned above, the altitude at which the peak aerodynamic forces are 
experienced depends on the characteristics of the vehicle.  The higher the ballistic 
coefficient of the vehicle, the lower in the atmosphere deceleration will begin, leading 
to greater atmospheric density during deceleration and therefore higher temperatures.  
However the actual peak acceleration will be the same for any given ballistic 
coefficient.  [21]. 
The vehicle characteristic that controls peak acceleration is the lift to drag 
ratio (L/D).  The higher the L/D of a vehicle the lower peak acceleration it will see.  
Few purely ballistic entry vehicles have been built because even a very small amount 
of lift can greatly decrease the peak accelerations experienced by a vehicle on an 
entry trajectory.  This leads to a much more gentle ride for the crew and the vehicle 
systems themselves.  The addition of lift will also increase the landing footprint of a 
vehicle.  This can be beneficial if there is a specific landing target set, as it allows for 
more leeway in initiating the entry.  
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4.3 Nominal Trajectory Design 
One of the initial requirements for this analysis was a nominal entry trajectory 
from which to stage simulated lifeboat ejections.  As was mentioned before, the US 
space shuttle was chosen to be used as the baseline vehicle. Effort was made to find 
an accurate representation of the US space shuttle’s reentry trajectory.  When no such 
trajectory could be obtained, it was decided to simulate one based on known metrics 
of the trajectory.  The design characteristics of the nominal vehicle were set to match 
those of the shuttle orbiter.  Other characteristics of the simulation, mainly roll angle 
and initial flight path angle, were modified until the simulation was close to the 
characteristics listed in table 4.1.  The simulated trajectory is shown in figure 4.2.   
Further information on the design of the simulation follows in the rest of chapter 4.   
 
4.4 Lifeboat Subsets 
Before any simulation was attempted, several theoretical types of ejection zones were 
defined along a normal reentry trajectory.  These zones were defined by the region 
along the nominal trajectory in which an ejection would be initiated.  Zone 1, for 
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Maximum Shuttle Simulated 
Acceleration (g’s)   < 3   2.2 
Dynamic Pressure   580 PSF 
  27,770 Pa 
  365 PSF 
  17,498 Pa 
Temperature (°C)   < 1650   1537 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Shuttle and Simulated Entry Trajectories 
 
instance, was defined as the part of the trajectory around entry interface, when 
aerodynamic forces are still at a minimum.  Ejecting in this zone would allow for time 
to orient the vehicle into the optimum orientation before any intense conditions would 
be encountered.  In addition, the vehicle would only have to be designed to withstand 
extremes that its own design would experience.  There would be no residual 
accelerations or temperature from the nominal vehicle to deal with.  Designs for 
ejections in this zone were proposed during the Apollo era.  
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Figure 4.1 Simulated Nominal Trajectory 
 
Zone 2 was defined as the regions on either side of Max Q, before and after 
the nominal vehicle has experienced the most extreme aerodynamic conditions.  
Lifeboats in this zone would have to be more rugged then those in zone 1, as ejections 
in this zone would be ejecting into at least somewhat intense residual conditions.  
They would have to quickly establish a stable orientation to avoid accelerations and 
temperatures in undesirable orientations.  
Zone 3 would then be the region directly around the nominal vehicle’s Max Q.  
This is the region where the highest temperatures and accelerations are experienced 
by the nominal vehicle, and therefore would be the least hospitable to an emergency 
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 ejection.  Vehicles ejecting into this zone would have to be very rugged to withstand 
the types of temperatures and accelerations that would be residual of the nominal 
vehicle.  
0 200 400 600 800 1000
 
Figure 4.2 Defined Ejection Zones Along Nominal Vehicle's Entry Trajectory 
 
4.5 Simulation Basis 
There were two main steps in the design of the simulation.  The first step involved 
using a preexisting spreadsheet simulation [20] to perform tests on selected data 
points of several different lifeboat designs to look for obvious trends.  The second 
step involved creating a new simulation in MATLABTM to do the continuous 
analysis.   
Both simulations have the same mathematical basis.  The equations of motion are  
calculated based on differential equations around flight path angle (γ), velocity (v), 
and altitude (h).  Numerically integrating these equations results in the trajectories for 
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 both the nominal vehicle and the lifeboats depending on which initial conditions are 
used. 
γ = D*(L/D) - (1-v/vcirc2) * g * cos(γ) * cos(θRoll)/v  Equation 0.1  
v = -D - g* sin(γ)-athrust       Equation 0.2  
h = v * sin (γ)       Equation 0.3 
[21] 
 
Temperature estimates on the outer heat shield of the lifeboat were based on the 
Chapman heating equations for laminar flow.  This equation returns stagnation point 
temperature estimates of the heating rate seen by the craft. 
q˙= 2*(2.568*10-9)*11.3538*((q / Rhs).5)* v3.2   
q = J/cm2
Rhs = m 
v =  m/s       Equation 0.4 [23] 
All other equations used in the simulation code were based on the results of the above 
four equations and can be found in the complete code printout in the appendix.   
 
4.6 Weaknesses in Initial Simulation 
The preexisting spreadsheet used in the initial simulation used most of the 
same  variables as the final coded simulation, including ballistic coefficient, radius of 
curvature of the heat shield, lift to drag ratio, and initial flight path angle, to calculate 
an entry trajectory.  While good enough for initial estimates, there were several 
reasons why this simulation was not capable enough for the final simulation.  The 
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 main reason was that the spreadsheet implementation made simulating more then a 
few trajectories at once complex.  This made it difficult to accomplish the goal of an 
exhaustive ejection map with the spreadsheet.    Secondly, the coded simulation made 
it easier to manipulate variables to obtain cleaner trajectories.  The spreadsheet 
simulation incorporated phugoid motion which actual shuttle trajectories are designed 
to avoid.  These phugoids suggested nearly double the peak acceleration actually seen 
in actual trajectories.  In the coded simulation, as with the actual shuttle, roll angles 
were used to avoid phugoids.  While this could have been done with the spreadsheet it 
was easier in code.    
There were two main functions for which the spreadsheet simulation was 
useful.  First, when obtaining the initial data points only hand picked points were 
used.  Therefore especially inaccurate sections of the trajectory could be avoided.  
Secondly, the spreadsheet was useful in error checking the coded simulation.    
 
 
4.7 Coded Simulation 
Because of the issues discussed above, after initial data points were studied, 
the next step was to rewrite the simulation in a more flexible platform.  MATLABTM 
was selected as the language to be used, and the code was written to simulate both the 
nominal trajectory and the lifeboat escapes.  The validated spreadsheet simulation 
was used as an error check for the code. Some differences were expected between the 
spreadsheet and coded simulation as different methods of integration were used.  4th 
order Runge Kutta numerical integration with a three second time step was used in 
the spreadsheet.  The coded simulation used the built in ODE45 numerical integration 
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 function.  While this function uses the same basic Runge Kutta equations, it makes 
multiple intermediate calculations inside the three second times step, with 
intermediate timesteps based on the rate of change of the function.   
The code works by first simulating a nominal trajectory based on supplied 
nominal vehicle characteristics and orbital start conditions.  Using start conditions 
pulled from that trajectory and a second set of supplied characteristics, it then 
calculates trajectories for lifeboats ejecting at set intervals for the duration of the 
nominal trajectory (figure 4.3).   Final results are then plotted in 3-d mesh plots, with 
significant results highlighted in 2-d plots.   
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 Updated
State Matrix
Numerically Integrate State Matrix
Differential Equations
Roll Angle
State Matrix
Calculate Density
Time Step
Calculate Remaining Variables
State Matrix
Altitude
Velocity
Flight Path Angle
Calculate Drag
Altitude
Mach #
Velocity
Atmospheric
Density
Drag
Trajectory Simulation Algorithm
 
Figure 4.3 Algorithm used for Trajectory Calculations 
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 Computer Simulation Algorithm
Calculate Nominal Trajectory
Set Loop Characteristics
Set Nominal Variables
Calculate Lifeboat Trajectory Based 
On Initial Conditions of Nominal 
Trajectory at Timestep
Increment Timestep
Until Stop Condition
Plot Results
Set Lifeboat Variables
 
Figure 4.4 Algorithm used in computer simulation  
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• Roll • Time • Flight Path 
Angle 
• Altitude • Dynamic 
Pressure 
• Downrange 
Distance 
• Crossrange 
Distance 
• Velocity • Sensed 
Acceleration 
• Mach 
Number 
• Heat Rate • Outer Shield 
Temperature 
• Inner Shield 
Temperature 
• Total 
Heat 
• Atmospheric 
Density 
• Yaw • Cp • Thrust 
 
Table 4.2 Tracked Variables in MATLAB Code Using the coded simulation, eighteen variables were tracked at each time step, 
and used to analyze the lifeboat trajectories (Table 4.2).  Of these variables the 
principle metrics for comparing the trajectories were sensed acceleration and outer 
shield temperature.  The calculation of another variable, inner shield temperature, was 
attempted, by writing a function to perform a finite difference analysis based on the 
proposed heat shield characteristics.  However, due to difficulty in defining boundary 
conditions, this code was deemed too inaccurate to be relied on.  Since inner 
temperatures are a more important metric with respect to survivability than outer 
temperatures calculations of inner shield temperature were made using empirical 
results as reported by the makers of the heat shield materials and other conference 
papers.  Based on these results, first order estimations of inner shield temperature 
could be made based on the outer shield temperature and the thickness of the heat 
shield material.  
Three of the above variables were calculated as a result of the numerical 
integration.  Flight path angle, altitude, and velocity were all results of the coupled 
differential equations at the center of the simulation (equations 4.1-4.3).  From these 
three variables the others could all be calculated.  The outer shield temperature results 
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 were estimated for peak stagnation point heating using the Chapman heating 
equations (equation 4.4).  The time variable represents the cumulative time since the 
start of the simulation.  Each lifeboat trajectory continues counting from the time of 
its launch so that the point in the trajectory at which the launch occurred is obvious at 
a glance.  The user at the beginning of each simulation run sets an internal variable, 
deltaT, that represents the time between reported results.  As a factor of using 
ODE45, the integration calculations are made using very small, varying timesteps.  
The results of these integrations however, are only reported over the set interval of 
deltaT.  In the case of this simulation, that interval was set at three seconds as this 
supplied a high density of data without overloading either the user or the system.  
Should greater results density be required, this can easily be changed to any 
reasonable time period. 
The roll variable was used primarily in the nominal trajectory.  By creating a 
roll trajectory that spent the maximum amount of time at high angles of roll, near 90), 
the amount and severity of phugoids were significantly decreased.  This allowed the 
final nominal trajectory to mimic that of an actual shuttle trajectory much better than 
the one that was used for the spot checks. 
Atmospheric density was calculated using a simple exponential based on 
altitude, however should it be required, the function can easily be changed to employ 
more accurate methods.    
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 Chapter 5:  Results 
 
5.1 Data Formats 
The data in this project was all obtained by manipulating the spreadsheet and 
simulation code to examine various escape scenarios.  The code was specifically 
written to maximize flexibility in both the styles of entry vehicle it could model and 
in how the data returned could be displayed.  Nominally several styles of graphs were 
displayed following each code run.  In addition, the complete raw results were saved 
to a series of text files to be further manipulated if needed.     
Three main configurations were used for this project.  The first configuration 
started with a set of initial conditions that produced the nominal trajectory.  The 
second changed the initial conditions, and ran the code through a series of loops to 
produce the series of lifeboat trajectories.  The third configuration used the previous 
two and added a loop that changed lifeboat design characteristics in search of overall 
optimum values.  As mentioned above, text and graphical output were stored in each 
run of the coded simulation.   
5.2 Initial Simulation Results 
In the first steps of this analysis, which used the spreadsheet simulation to 
look for broad trends which could be refined in the coded simulation, lifeboat ejection 
points along the nominal trajectory were handpicked to obtain lifeboat trajectories in 
two ejection scenarios.  Since this first simulation was simply looking for broad 
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 trends a higher range of conditions was considered than would actually be expected to 
be encountered.  Ejection points and lifeboat variables were all considered at 
extremes.  It was hoped that these extremes would accentuate variations caused either 
by the conditions at ejection or by the designs of the lifeboats themselves.   
The first scenario was a trajectory at an ejection acceleration close to twice 
what could be expected in a normal shuttle trajectory.  This was to be considered the 
ultimate worst case, and would never be encountered in a shuttle reentry.  The second 
scenario was an ejection at an acceleration more typical of a shuttle style trajectory.  
The resulting trajectories were compared based on plots of acceleration and 
temperature (figures 5.1-5.3). 
Two different styles of lifeboats (Table 5.1) were checked under these 
conditions to determine if there were any obvious trends.  The lifeboat design was the 
same for both tests except for the ballistic coefficient, .  Ballistic coefficient is 
expressed as equation 5.1, and is used to determine the amount of drag on an object.  
Two different ballistic coefficients were used in the initial tests, a very light lifeboat 
with  of 100 kg/m2 and a heavier, more dense lifeboat with  of 1000 kg/m2.  The 
results of these checks are summarized in Table 5.2. 
 m / ACd     Equation 5.1 
Figure 5.1 shows a plot of how the trajectories unfold over time.  The nominal 
trajectory shows the large phugoids that made the spreadsheet entry trajectory 
unsuitable for the overall nominal trajectory in this study.  The effect of ballistic 
coefficient in the ejection trajectory is seen in this graph, as the high beta lifeboats 
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Heat Shield 
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Lift to Drag 
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Acceleration 
at Mid-Stress 
Ejection (g) 
Acceleration 
at High-
Stress 
Ejection (g) 
Baseline Trajectory 
Initial Flight Path 
Angle () (degrees) 
100  2.8  .2 1  3.5  2 
1000 2.8 .2 1 3.5 2 
 5.1 Characteristics of Lifeboat and Check Points in Spreadsheet Simulation cend in a much steeper trajectory from the moment of ejection than the low beta 
boats, which maintain a slower, more gradual descent.  While this graph is useful 
isualizing the trajectories it does not help in deciding on optimal design 
racteristics.  For that the other two graphs must be used. 
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ure 5.1 Spreadsheet Simulation Results, Altitude vs. Time 
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Figure 5.2 Spreadsheet Simulation Results, Acceleration vs. Time 
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Figure 5.3 Spreadsheet Simulation Results, Outer Shield Temperature vs. Time 
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Figure 5.2 shows the acceleration spikes caused by ejection.  In this case the 
low beta case is the more extreme as instantaneous accelerations peak above 35 g’s.  
The high beta case peaks at a more manageable 10 g’s.    To put this in perspective, 
astronauts in an Apollo launch escape systems would have experienced 20 g 
acceleration spikes for a period of several seconds, while the survivable acceleration 
spike as determined by rocket sled tests is around 84 g’s for 0.04 seconds[23]. 
Ejection Point Low Beta Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Low Beta Peak 
Temperature ()F) 
High Beta Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
High Beta Peak 
Temperature ()F) 
Mid-Stress Point 
(1 g acceleration 
at ejection) 
20.6 2156.5 6.6 2678 
High-Stress 
Point (3.5 g 
acceleration at 
ejection) 
36.4 1867.5 10.3 1993 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of Results of Lifeboat Check Point Tests 
 
Several trends were apparent from the initial comparisons.  First, the harshest 
conditions in the lifeboat trajectory were seen immediately after its ejection from the 
primary vehicle.  The sudden change in vehicle characteristics, from large high  
vehicles to smaller lower  ones, caused a sharp spike in both the acceleration and the 
temperatures.  These spikes subside very quickly, not lasting much more then 10 
seconds in the worst case before subsiding to the nominal value for the new ship’s 
characteristics.  Despite their short duration, at their peaks these spikes would most 
likely create conditions beyond the acceptable limits for either vessel or crew.  
However, the peak point in this comparison was for conditions especially chosen to 
be worse than could be expected in an actual mission, so only trend based conclusions 
should be drawn from it.    
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  A second trend apparent in the initial study was that the closer the ballistic 
coefficient of the lifeboat is to that of the nominal vehicle, the gentler the transition 
upon ejection.  Since the spike is caused by the transition between the high ballistic 
coefficient, lifting trajectory of the nominal vehicle to the lower ballistic coefficient, 
more ballistic trajectory of the lifeboat, it makes sense that the more similar those two 
vehicles are, the easier the transition will be.   
The obvious solution to this would be to try to match the ballistic coefficients 
of the nominal and lifeboat vehicles.  There are, however, several problems with this 
idea.  First, while the shock accelerations may be smaller, vehicles with high ballistic 
coefficients and see higher temperatures than otherwise similar low ballistic 
coefficient vehicles.  Second, it would be nearly impossible to build a functional 
lifeboat with even close to the ballistic coefficient of the shuttle.  The shuttle has a 
ballistic coefficient on the order of 3000 kg/m^2.  A lifeboat with a similar ballistic 
coefficient and a presumed mass of 1000 kg would require a heat shield with a cross 
sectional radius of about 0.2 meters.  Assuming a crew couch width of 0.5 meters and 
height of 1.5 m based on the NASA standard dimensions for a 95th percentile 
American male [24], this is too small a diameter to allow for even a one person 
lifeboat, let alone a multiple crew lifeboat (figure 5.4).   
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 = 3000 kg/m2
x-sect d= 0.46 m
= 650 kg/m2
x-sect d= 0.99 m
= 100 kg/m2
x-sect d= 2.52 m
= 1000 kg/m2
x-sect d= 0.80 m
Figure 5.4 Heat Shield Sizes for 1000 kg Lifeboat with varying ballistic coefficients.  Couch 
dimensions are 1.5 m tall by .5 m wide. 
 
From this apparent trade off between acceleration spikes, maximum shield 
temperatures and dimensional feasibility, it was decided to search for a favorable 
escape vehicle ballistic coefficient that would find a balance between these extremes.  
Unfortunately the spreadsheet was not set up in a way to easily allow this to be done.  
Neither was it designed to do the continuous trajectory analysis that was the final goal 
of this project.   
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 5.3 Coded Simulation Results 
The next stage of the analysis began with the writing and testing of the coded 
simulation.  Once checked against the previously verified spreadsheet results, it was 
set to step through the various lifeboat design parameters of lift to drag ratio, ballistic 
coefficient and heat shield radius of curvature to determine the overall optimum 
values for a full trajectory lifeboat.  Ranges for these searches were set based on a 
combination of known values and assumptions.   It was assumed that the lifeboat 
would have a ballistic coefficient smaller than that of the nominal vehicle so the 
approximate shuttle ballistic coefficient of 3000 was set as the maximum value in the 
search.  It was also assumed that the lifeboat would not be a glider style vehicle, so 
the maximum lift to drag ratio was set as 1.  Finally, the values for the radius of 
curvature of the heat shield was arbitrarily set between 1 meter and 5 meters with the 
knowledge that, if trends showed larger shields were preferred a greater range of 
values could be explored.  For each characteristic set the simulation ran through 
ejections spaced throughout the trajectory.  For each characteristic the worst observed 
metrics were recorded in a graph.  The results of this search are shown in figure 5.5 
and 5.6.   
The graphs show that the strength of the correlation between vehicle 
characteristic and their effect on the trajectory varies, with ballistic coefficient having 
the overall strongest effect and lift to drag ratio having the overall weakest.  A 
summary of the trends is in table 5.3.  Using these results nominal characteristics for 
the lifeboat were set to be a ballistic coefficient of 650 kg/m2, a lift to drag ratio of 0.2 
and a heat shield radius of 2.8 m.  While a larger lift to drag ratio would have resulted  
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Figure 5.5  Results of Optimum Ballistic Coefficient Search  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Results of Optimum Lift to Drag and Heat Shield Radius Searches 
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 Characteristic Effect on Trajectory 
Higher worst case temperatureStrong Larger 
Higher worst case Smaller 
Lower worst case temperature Weak Larger L/D 
Lower worst case acceleration 
Lower worst case temperature Larger Heat Shield 
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 Table 5.3  Correlation Strengths of Vehicle Characteristics to Experienced
Conditions  slightly lower temperatures and accelerations, the added complications to the 
jectory would likely have outweighed any mitigating effects. 
Once nominal values were defined, the initial conditions in the code were 
set and the code was run with closely spaced ejections to obtain a high definition 
ta set (figure 5.7).  In addition the maximum allowable acceleration was set at 8 
s, assuming the use of thrust to counteract excess acceleration above this value.  
nce the acceleration spike is caused by the sudden change in ballistic coefficient, it 
n be partly counteracted by a short duration thrust in the direction of the velocity 
ctor, slowing the rate of deceleration at the ejection point.  Full results were 
aphed in 3-d mesh plots, while the worst point from each run, along with important 
tails about where in the ejection trajectory it occurred, were pulled out and graphed 
 a second plot (figures 5.8-5.12). 
While the 3-d mesh plots may be difficult to read for data from specific 
ctions, they provide valuable information about the trend of the reentry.  The high 
perature peaks in figure 5.8 are sharp, showing that the conditions tend to be of 
ort duration with cooler temperatures throughout most of the trajectory.  In 
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 addition, while many of the ejections will see maximum temperatures on the order of 
1600° C, only a small portion of ejections occurring in a limited altitude and time 
range will see the absolute peak temperatures of 1800° C.  The 3-d acceleration plots, 
figure 5.8, shows incidents of peak acceleration to be even more transient than the 
temperature peaks.  Near maximum accelerations are seen only immediately after 
ejection and then only for short periods.  Through the rest of the trajectory mesh 
accelerations are in the more moderate 3 to 4 g range.  Coupled with figure 5.9, figure 
5.10, the counter thrust mesh plot, shows how little thrust would be needed to keep 
accelerations below the 8 g maximum set in this project.  Short bursts of thrust 
immediately after ejection would theoretically slow deceleration enough to limit the  
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 Figure 5.7 Sampling of Simulation Trajectory Results Evenly Space Over Nominal Trajectory 
for Optimal Lifeboat with Design Characteristics of β=650 kg/m2, L/D = .2 and Heat Shield 
Radius=2.8 m. 
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Figure 5.8 Three Dimensional Mesh Plot of Shield Temperature vs Altitude and 
Time  
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Figure 5.9  Three Dimensional Mesh Plot of Acceleration vs Altitude and Time with Maximum 
Accleration set to 8 g’s 
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Figure 5.10 Three Dimensional Mesh Plot of Required Thrust vs Altitude and Time with 
Maximum Acceleration set to 8 g’s 
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effects of the g spike on the lifeboat vehicle.  Since these thrusts are only required 
immediately after ejection, they could be built into the attitude control system that 
will be required to stabilize the escape vehicle in an optimum orientation. 
The worst point plots (figures 5.11-5.12) show the highest acceleration and 
temperature on any given ejection, along with the altitude at ejection and how long 
after the ejection this peak occurred.  From these worst point plots the least favorable 
regions for ejection can be determined.  These regions are seen in both the plots of 
temperatures and accelerations, and can be hypothesized to be the most dangerous 
times to attempt an ejection.  In both cases, the worst points are those surrounding the 
nominal trajectory’s period of maximum dynamic pressure (max q).  In the case of 
acceleration the worst points tend to immediately precede max q, while the 
temperature plots show worst case immediately following max q.   These worst point 
plots can be used to define the ejection zones referred to earlier in this paper. 
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Figure 5.11  Worst Acceleration Occurrence Per Ejection Trajectory 
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Figure 5.12  Worst Temperature Occurrence Per Ejection Trajectory 
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 These zones can be mapped onto the graphs of the worst acceleration and 
temperature occurrences and the times at which they occurred (figures 5.13-5.14).  
When examining these charts, it is apparent that these three zones occur in slightly 
different places around the maximum dynamic pressure for the different metrics, 
though for planning purposes they can probably be combined into one zone set. 
The worst case accelerations are found in ejections within 4 minutes following 
the maximum dynamic pressure.  Four of the five highest accelerations are seen in 
this period, with the fifth being an ejection during a phugoid, which is a consequence 
of the estimated trajectory, and should be of a smaller magnitude or nonexistent in a 
true trajectory.  However, the ejections where the worst case acceleration occurs 
sooner after ejection, which may be the harder case to plan for, occur earlier in the 
nominal trajectory then those where the peak temperature is experienced. 
The worst case temperature scenario is more complicated.  Through the first 
ejection zone, the maximum temperature stays flat and occurs at the same absolute 
time in the trajectory regardless of the actual time of ejection.  These ejections occur 
high enough in the atmosphere that the atmospheric density is still too low to cause 
high heating rates.   The temperature peaks, as expected, in the four minutes 
immediately preceding ejection at maximum dynamic pressure, however, this is also 
the period during which the aforementioned phugoid occurs.  While in general the 
higher maximum temperatures occur in earlier ejections because of the longer period 
in flight to gather heat, these peak temperatures may be partially a factor of the 
phugoid.  Even so, the peaks only spike about 200 )C above the temperatures seen in 
earlier ejections, well within the capabilities of ablative heat shields.  The reality of 
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 the temperature extremes will just be used to determine the thickness of the heat 
shield that is required, and from there, the expected mass.  The bigger problem with 
temperature is that, if near peak temperatures are seen immediately after ejection, 
 
Figure 5.13 Acceleration Based Ejection Zones. Zone 1 is Green, Zone 2 is Yellow and Zone 3 is 
Red
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
10 
140
0 
5 
A
cc
 (g
’ s
) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1400 
1 
2 
Th
ru
st
 (g
’s
) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1400 
1000 
2000 
Ti
m
e 
M
ax
 A
cc
 
(s
) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1400 
500 
1000 
P
os
t E
je
ct
io
n 
Ti
m
e 
M
ax
 A
cc
 (s
) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1400 
1 
2 x 10 
5 
Ejection Number
A
lti
tu
de
 a
t 
E
je
ct
io
n 
(m
) 
   
 
 
  
Nominal Trajectory Dynamic Pressure 
Peak 
 65 
 
  
 
 
 
2000 
 
Figure 5.14  Temperature Based Ejection Zones. Zone 1 is Green, Zone 2 is Yellow and Zone 3 is 
Red 
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 when the attitude of the lifeboat is at its least controlled, more shielding will be 
needed over the whole of the vehicle.  If the vehicle attitude can be controlled before 
the temperature extremes are reached, only shielding in the velocity direction will be 
required.   
391
741
390
740
1839 )C
1513 )C
Temperature
791
405
NA
NA
17498 Pa
15670 Pa
Dynamic Pressure in 
Nominal Trajectory
791
411
790
410
9.69 g’s 
8.83 g’s
Acceleration
(no counter thrust)
Time (s)Ejection Time (s)MaximumMetric
 
Table 5.5 Harshest Conditions and Time of Occurrence in Optimum Lifeboat  
 
As was mentioned previously, the overall harshest conditions in a given set of 
trajectories are experienced immediately after the ejection from the nominal vehicle 
around the point of maximum dynamic pressure.  This is true for any ballistic 
coefficient lifeboat, though the intensity of this peak depends on the ballistic 
coefficients of both the nominal vehicle and the lifeboat.  The sudden change in 
vehicle characteristics at an already stressful moment causes sudden spikes in both 
sensed acceleration and shield temperature.  However these spikes subside relatively 
quickly, within a matter of seconds.   
Zone 1 was defined as having orbital or near orbital conditions.  This means 
the atmospheric density is still very low, and acceleration and temperature effects are 
still minimal.  A type 1 lifeboat would be designed with these specific conditions in 
mind.  This would be a limited escape lifeboat, and by far the easiest type to design.  
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 Since the only extreme conditions that would be seen are defined by the 
characteristics of its design rather than the environment it ejects into, this vehicle 
could be made with minimal structure and shielding.  It would also need minimal 
attitude control as ejection would not occur immediately into extreme conditions and 
time could be taken to orient it correctly.  This type of vehicle would be comparable 
to the MOOSE escape concept of the 1960’s.   
Zone 2 was defined as the region on either side of the maximum dynamic 
pressure of the nominal trajectory.  A lifeboat designed for this zone would have to be 
sturdier with more structure and shielding, as some ejection extremes would be 
experienced.  Attitude control in this vehicle would also be more critical as there 
would be little or no time to orient before the environmental extremes are 
experienced, whether these come from the ejection environment or from the lifeboat’s 
own trajectory.  However any lifeboat that could survive a zone 2 ejection would also 
be fully capable of surviving a zone 1 ejection.    
Zone 3 lifeboats would be the most challenging problem.  Zone 3 was defined 
as the region directly around the nominal trajectory’s max q, where all environmental 
extremes are experienced.  Due to the shock of ejection, a lifeboat ejecting in this 
zone would be immediately dealing with a more extreme environment then either the 
nominal or lifeboat vehicles would otherwise see.  In this type of vehicle it will be 
critical to be able to immediately point the vehicle in the optimum reentry orientation.  
Not only will it be difficult and prohibitively mass intensive to provide sufficient 
structural support and heat shielding for the entire lifeboat, but the g shock will be 
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 sufficient that if the crew is not correctly oriented, they would most likely sustain 
serious injuries. 
In this chapter, the overall optimum characteristics of the lifeboat were 
defined.  While the characteristics arrived at here, a ballistic coefficient of 650 kg/m2, 
a lift to drag ratio of 0.2, and a heat shield radius of 2.8 m, are optimum for the 
mission, a different set of characteristics would be optimum in each zone, with the 
defined characteristics a compromise between them.    
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Chapter 6:  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
6.1 General Findings 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether emergency escape was 
feasible throughout the duration of a space mission.  The data reported in the chapter 
above seems to support that a mission wide ejection scenario could be immediately 
fatal in a sufficiently designed lifeboat.  Assuming the lifeboat can be quickly pointed 
in the correct orientation, the acceleration and temperature regimes it sees are in no 
case so intense to be beyond the limits of survivability.   Thus the limits on the ability 
to build such a craft will be due to mass, cost, or the limits of current technology, not 
mechanical limits.  
What is not necessarily clear is whether or not this scenario is required.  Of 
the 11 missions studied in Chapter 3 (table 6.1), six had anomalies that caused or 
could have caused problems to the entry process.  Of those five, three of the missions, 
Mercury MA-6, Gemini 8 and Soyuz 1, first experienced problems while the vehicle 
was still in orbit.  In two other missions, Soyuz 5 and Soyuz 11, the problems began 
with the retro burn to initiate the reentry process.  Only the Columbia incident 
occurred in the atmosphere with no prior warning.  While this is a small data pool 
from which to draw conclusions, it could be argued that lifting vehicles are generally 
more vulnerable to suddenly occurring fatal errors during the later stages of reentry.  
From historical data it appears that, in the case of capsule-style vehicles, anomalies 
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 which lead to reentry problems are usually apparent before reentry actually begins.  
While it may be possible to design a vehicle that can eject at any point, it may not be 
worth the mass and cost to do so for this class of vehicle.  If a sufficient percentage of 
anomalies can be spotted from orbit it may only be necessary or desirable to build a 
zone 1 lifeboat.  This prospect is much less expensive in both mass and cost and 
could probably be fairly easily incorporated into new vehicle designs.    
 
6.2 Future Work 
6.2.1 Trade Studies on Lifeboat Styles 
  6.2.1.1 Limited Ejection Periods 
If, as is conjectured above, it is not efficient to design a lifeboat for the full 
spectrum of entry ejections, then the optimums presented earlier in this paper are not 
applicable.  The optimum values found in the search performed in this analysis are 
the optimums as represented by ejections through the whole nominal entry trajectory, 
including the worst case points which will drive the escape system design.  Should 
the full trajectory approach not be used a different set of optimum values will be 
required, based on the portions of the nominal trajectory considered suitable for 
ejection.   
 71 
 
 No Type 1 Service Module Failed 
to Separate 
1969 Soyuz 5 
Yes ABO Engine Failure 1985 STS-51-F 
Type 3 
LES 
LES 
ATAL 
Type 1 
Type 1 or 
Type 3 
Type 1 
LES 
Type 1 
Lifeboat 
Method 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
EnactedIncident Year Mission 
Heat Shield Failure 2003 STS-107 
Booster Explosion 1986 STS-51-L 
Booster Fire 1983 Soyuz T-10A 
Faulty Booster 1975 Soyuz 18 
Sudden Decompression 1971 Soyuz 11 
ACS Failure 1967 Soyuz 1 
ACS Failure 1966 Gemini 8 
Premature Booster 
Shutdown 
1965 Gemini 6 
Signal indicating 
prematurely detached 
heat shield 
1962 Mercury MA-
6 
Table 6.1 Summary of Historical Space Safety Incidents and Possible Mitigation Methods  
 
Based on trends observed in this analysis, if the period around the nominal 
maximum dynamic pressure is excluded, there will be several beneficial effects on 
the  lifeboat vehicle design.  First, the optimum ballistic coefficient will most likely 
drop significantly.  This will allow for designs with larger heat shields on lighter 
vehicles, a problem that, as demonstrated by figure 5.4, will currently make vehicle 
design fairly difficult.  Secondly, excluding the period of the trajectory around max q 
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 will minimize both the g-shock and temperature shock that is seen in the first seconds 
after ejection, allowing for less required structure and shielding.  
Further, limiting the valid ejection period to the segment of the trajectory 
described above as zone 1 would allow for still easier lifeboat design.  In this case 
there is no g-spike upon ejection, and the characteristics of the entry trajectory are 
much more under the control of the astronaut or mission control, allowing for better 
control of the landing zone for the lifeboat.  The controllable entry conditions would 
also allow for even less structure and shielding, leading to a still lighter vehicle.  
While the historical findings presented above seem to indicate that a zone 1 lifeboat is 
the most useful, a full trade study should be performed, first to find the optimum 
design characteristics for lifeboats designed for the various ejection zones, and second 
to analyze the mass and design savings versus the possible loss of life by limiting the 
ejection options. 
 
  6.2.1.2 Size and Occupancy of Ejection Capsule 
A second issue that should be looked at in a trade study is the size of the 
lifeboat.  Should each member of the crew be strapped into separately ejecting 
lifeboats or is some form of ejecting cabin for the entire crew preferable.  There are 
two main unknowns in this question.  First, is whether or not separate ejection 
capsules actually present any safety benefit over a full crew capsule.  Second, the size 
of the mass penalty for separate capsules needs to be determined as well as 
advantages and disadvantages of both designs.  Inherent in this study should be mass 
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 and cost estimates for the various styles of lifeboats, as this will be the main driving 
force behind the design of actual vehicles.       
6.2.2 Methods for Minimizing G-Shock 
Should a full mission lifeboat be designed after all, the most pressing issue in 
the design will be the sudden g-shock that occurs when the ship characteristics 
suddenly change.  While the temperature issues can be dealt with given sufficient 
shielding, the crew and vehicle structure have a limited acceptable acceleration range.  
Analysis has shown that one way to reduce this shock is to match the ballistic 
coefficients of the lifeboat with that of the nominal vehicle as closely as possible.  
However, when dealing with high ballistic coefficient nominal vehicles, there is a 
limit to how closely that can be done before the lifeboat vehicle would become 
unworkable.  As was shown in figure 5.4, in order to maintain a high enough ballistic 
coefficient to avoid a tremendous g-shock the size of the cross sectional area of the 
vehicle, and hence the size of the heat shield, has to be kept unworkably small.  If a 
method could be created to alleviate the g-shock while lowering the ballistic 
coefficient, this would provide several benefits.   
The main benefit, as was mentioned above, is that it would allow the heat 
shield diameter to be raised to a workable size.  Though this analysis has shown that 
it is theoretically possible to design a lifeboat that could be used mission wide, the 
limitations placed on it will also make it very hard to build.  The ballistic coefficient 
requirement will require it to either be too heavy or too small to be very feasible.  
Finding a method to alleviate the g-shock until the lifeboat is set into the new 
trajectory would solve this problem.    
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 Below several concepts for reducing the g-shock are discussed.  While none 
have been analytically proven, all are theoretically possible with available 
technology.  Future  work may determine which of these is truly feasible and worthy 
of more study. 
 
 6.2.2.1 Deployable Heat Shield 
One way to limit both acceleration and temperature might be to use a 
deployable heat shield.  In this design the lifeboat would have a minimal heat shield 
for the initial ejection.  After ejection, additional heat shield area would deploy, 
decreasing the ballistic coefficient in a controlled manner.  This would allow for a 
high ballistic coefficient at ejection when that is preferable, with a decreasing ballistic 
coefficient after the initial ejection which will limit the maximum temperature in the 
later stages of entry. 
Deployable heat shields have at least some flight history.  Various designs 
have been used since the 1960’s, mostly in smaller satellites and flight tests.  Such a 
heat shield is both space and mass efficient as only the stowed space needs to be 
accounted for.  In some cases this form of heat shield can also act as a parachute 
decreasing even further the required lifeboat mass [25].   
One main question with this style design are the details of shield deployment 
under ejection conditions.  Deployable heat shields that have already flown deploy 
above the atmosphere, in the region referred to here as zone 1.  It is unclear whether 
such a shield could be designed to deploy in zone 2 or zone 3 conditions.  This style 
heat shield is also most common on small payloads.  Another issue to look into is 
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 whether the designs for deployable heat shields can support the mass requirements of 
a lifeboat.  Most of the current designs have only flown very small payloads.  More 
testing and development work will need to be done before this concept can be 
considered realistic.     
  6.2.2.2 Counter Thrust 
Another conceptual way to alleviate the g-shock might be the previously 
mentioned idea of using a short counter thrust to decrease the rate of deceleration in 
the first few seconds after ejection.  A variation of this has been used in the Soviet 
Soyuz program where hydrogen peroxide jets fire during the reentry reducing thermal 
and gravity loads [14].  Thrusting against the deceleration vector, thus preventing it 
from decelerating too quickly, might be the most efficient way to prevent a large g-
shock.  Since any vehicle design is going to require some amount of attitude control, 
the mechanisms for this method will most likely already be included in the design.  
The only additional mass requirement in this case would then be a larger fuel supply 
and possibly slightly larger engines.  If this method proves viable it might be the most 
efficient way to limit the conditions experienced by the lifeboat.   
 
6.2.2.3 Added Nominal Mass 
A passive method to increase the size of the heat shield while holding the 
ballistic coefficient steady might be to store more of the primary vehicle systems 
inside the lifeboat frame.  The main constraint on increasing the mass of the lifeboat 
is that a minimal amount of excess launch mass is required.  By placing nominal 
systems inside the lifeboat the nominal launch mass is not increased, but the lifeboat 
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 mass is.  A problem with this concept is that it will require a larger lifeboat vehicle in 
order to provide room to stow these systems.   
 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
Space travel, like all explorations of frontiers throughout history, is 
dangerous.  No lifeboat or abort method is going to be able to avoid all accidents or 
injuries.  If human space exploration is going to continue, the best that can be hoped 
for is to learn from past mistakes and to make plans for as many imagined 
contingencies as possible. This thesis has hopefully open up one more contingency 
option in future spacecraft designs.   In the Crew Exploration Vehicle currently being 
designed requirements will likely call for at least a launch escape system.  This thesis 
suggests that, at the very least, an orbital escape system or type 1 lifeboat would also 
be a valuable addition.  In addition, if such an orbital escape system is designed, the 
same principles could perhaps be used to create emergency escape vehicles for the 
International Space Station.  Such a system would greatly enhance the functionality 
of the station, which is currently limited by the escape capabilities of the attached 
Soyuz capsule.   
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 Appendix A: MATLAB Simulation Code 
 
EntryMap Readme 
This code is set to calculate the trajectories of a lifeboat escaping at set time periods 
from a nominal reentry trajectory.  The code can be run from the EntryMap.m file.  
The nominal vehicle characteristics and general program constants such as the 
timestep, earth radius, etc, are in Get_Start_Constants.m.  The lifeboat vehicle 
characteristics are in Get_Constants.m.  All program constants are set in one of these 
two files.  Aerocalcs.m is the function responsible for calculating the trajectory 
characteristics for each timestep.  Equations inside this function are documented with 
their sources.   
 
  
function EntryMap  
%March 19, 2004********************************** 
%function EntryMap.m 
%Uses Functions********************************* 
%   Get_Constants 
%   Get_Start_Constants 
%   doitloop 
%   statsloop 
 
    clear; 
    close all; 
 
%Array Columns ***************************** 
    global Roll Time Flt_angle Alt DynP Downrange Crossrange Vel Sensed_Acc 
Mach   
    global Heat_Rate Shield_Tempo Shield_Tempi Tot_Heat Density Yaw Cp Lgth 
 
%Constants*************************** 
    global mu Re deltaT LoD Rhs gravity d2r 
 78 
 
     global Gamma Velocity Height Rt 
    global sh_iters oldtemps 
    global increment addthrust depthinc runstats  
    [data]=Get_Start_Constants; 
    width=Lgth; %Lght is always the last column  
%******************************************************* 
    addthrust=0; 
    [starttraj counter]=doitloop(data, oldtemps); 
    Get_Constants; 
    depth=0; 
    conditions(1,1,1)=0; 
    for loop=1:depthinc:counter 
        depth=depth+1 
        [temp1 counter1]=doitloop(starttraj(loop,:), oldtemps); 
        temp1(1,Lgth)=counter1; 
        [conditions(1:counter1,1:width, depth)]=temp1; 
        %[conditions(depth,1:length,1:width)]=temp1; 
    end %loop 
    if runstats==1 
        temp=statsloop(starttraj,conditions); 
    end %if statement 
 
function Get_Constants 
%Last Update 3/23/04 
%Function Assigns Global Constants for escape vehicle 
%Calls:  
%   Get_Density 
%Called By: 
%  EntryMap 
 
%Globals (Constants)***************************** 
global LoD beta Rhs rolleqtn addthrust 
 
LoD=.2; 
beta=650; 
%beta=1000; 
Rhs=2.808;          %meters 
rolleqtn='0';         %character string Equation to be evaluated for Roll values 
%thrust=500;           %thrust to be added to first time step of each escape   
%end %Get_Constants     
%**************************************************** 
%Finite Difference Heating 
global alpha matthick oldtemps layers densv densc ablate 
ablate=0; 
%kappa=.18; 
matthick=.05; 
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 delx=.001; 
layers=matthick/delx; 
%cv=1087.84; %J/Kg-K 
[kappa temp cv temp2]=Get_Kappas(282.4); 
oldtemps=0; 
densv=13/(((.3048)^3)*2.205);  %Hyperlight virgin density converted to Kg/m^3 
densc=6.27/(((.3048)^3)*2.205);  %Hyperlight charred density converted to Kg/m^3 
%dens=224.25;        %Flexible Min-K numbers converted to Kg/m^3 
dens=densv; 
alpha=kappa/(dens*cv); 
%end Get_Constants 
 
function [data]=Get_Start_Constants 
% 
%function data=Get_Start_Constants 
%Last Update 3/23/04 
%Function Assigns Global Constants 
%Calls:  
%   Get_Density 
%Called By: 
%   EntryMap 
%Assigns Globals and initial conditions for original entry vehicle. 
 
%Array Columns (Globals) ***************************** 
global Roll Time Flt_angle Alt DynP Downrange Crossrange Vel Sensed_Acc Mach   
global Heat_Rate Shield_Tempo Shield_Tempi Tot_Heat Density Yaw Cp Thrst Lgth 
global Gamma Velocity Height Rt 
 
    Roll=1; 
    Time=Roll+1; 
    Flt_angle=Time+1; 
    Alt=Flt_angle+1;; 
    DynP=Alt+1; 
    Downrange=DynP+1; 
    Crossrange=Downrange+1; 
    Vel=Crossrange+1; 
    Sensed_Acc=Vel+1; 
    Mach=Sensed_Acc+1; 
    Heat_Rate=Mach+1; 
    Shield_Tempo=Heat_Rate+1; 
    Shield_Tempi=Shield_Tempo+1; 
    Tot_Heat=Shield_Tempi+1; 
    Density=Tot_Heat+1; 
    Yaw=Density+1; 
    Cp=Yaw+1; 
    Thrst=Cp+1; 
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     Lgth=Thrst+1; 
     
    Gamma=1; 
    Velocity=2; 
    Height=3; 
    Rt=4; 
%Globals (Constants)***************************** 
global mu Re deltaT LoD beta Rhs gravity d2r increment rolleqtn Rollcount depthinc 
max_acc 
 
gravity=9.80665;    %m/s^2 
mu=3.986004e14;     %m^3/s^2 
Re=6378000;         %radius of Earth (m) 
deltaT=.5;           %seconds 
LoD=1; 
beta=3000; 
max_acc=8; 
Rhs=10;          %meters 
d2r=pi/180;     %degree to radian conversion 
increment=10;   %time increment between results printed to screen in stats2 
depthinc=20;%******************               %Fineness of Grid: < depthinc -> finer 
grid  
%rolleqtn='90*(sin((time)/tou+(pi)))^1';     %Equation for Roll Calculation called in 
GetRoll 
rolleqtn='90*(sin(time/tou))^1';     %Equation for Roll Calculation called in GetRoll 
%rolleqtn='0';     %Equation for Roll Calculation called in Get Roll 
Rollcount=1; 
%***Initial Conditions************** 
counter=1; 
data(counter,Roll)=0; 
data(counter,Time)=0; 
%data(counter,Flt_angle)=0; 
data(counter,Flt_angle)=-2; 
%data(counter,Alt)=79000; 
data(counter,Alt)=160000; 
data(counter,DynP)=0; 
%data(counter,Vel)=6859.3; 
data(counter,Vel)=(mu/(data(Alt)+Re))^.5; 
data(counter,Downrange)=0; 
data(counter,Crossrange)=0; 
data(counter, Sensed_Acc)=0; 
data(counter,Mach)=22.46; 
data(counter, Heat_Rate)=1.58; 
data(counter,Shield_Tempo)=192.6 
data(counter,Shield_Tempi)=20 
data(counter,Tot_Heat)=0; 
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 data(counter,Density)=Get_Density(data(counter, Alt)); 
data(counter,Yaw)=0; 
data(counter,Cp)=1.84; 
data(counter,Thrst)=0; 
 
%data(counter,Drag)=0; 
 
%**************************************************** 
%Finite Difference Heating 
global alpha matthick oldtemps layers ablate 
ablate=0; 
kappa=.18; 
matthick=.5; 
cv=1087.84; %J/Kg-K 
oldtemps=0; 
dens=224.25;        %Flexible Min-K numbers converted to Kg/m^3 
alpha=kappa/(dens*cv); 
layers=4; 
%**************************************************** 
global runstats plotit 
global foldpath filename filename1 filename2 statefile savefiles 
global ndens ndrag 
runstats=1; 
savefiles=1; 
plotit=1; 
parent=eval('cd'); 
newfold='testfiles'; 
foldpath=sprintf('%s\\%s',parent, newfold); 
dirstring=sprintf('mkdir %s',newfold); 
eval(dirstring); 
%Trouble causing first letters \n,\r,\t,\b,\f 
%In case of one of above use \\ not \ 
filename=sprintf('%s\\workingtraj.txt',foldpath); 
filename1=sprintf('%s\\starttraj',foldpath); 
filename2=sprintf('%s\\entrytraj',foldpath); 
 
 
%end Get_Start_Constants 
 
function [data, counter]=doitloop(aero, oldtemps) 
%March 19, 2004********************************** 
%doitloop.m 
%Called by 
%   EntryMap 
%Uses Functions********************************* 
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 %   Get_Constants 
%   aerocalcs 
%   stats 
 
%Array Columns ***************************** 
    global Roll Time Flt_angle Alt DynP Downrange Crossrange Vel Sensed_Acc 
Mach   
    global Heat_Rate Shield_Tempo Shield_Tempi Tot_Heat Density Yaw Cp Thrst 
Lgth 
 
%Constants*************************** 
    global mu Re deltaT LoD Rhs gravity d2r max_acc 
    global Gamma Velocity Height Rt 
    global increment  
    data=aero; 
    counter=1; 
%Find Initial State*********************************** 
    height=Re+data(Alt); 
    state(Gamma)=data(Flt_angle)*d2r; 
    state(Velocity)=data(Vel); 
    state(Height)=data(Alt); 
    state(Rt)=0; 
    chardepth=0; 
%*************************************** 
    while data(counter,Alt) > 10000 
        last=counter; 
        counter=counter+1; %******************** 
        [data(counter,:) state(counter,:) oldtemps]=aerocalcs(data(last,:), state(last,:), 
oldtemps, chardepth); 
        toscreen=0; 
        if toscreen==1 
            disp(sprintf('Time= %d seconds',data(counter,Time))); 
            disp(sprintf('Altitude= %d meters',data(counter,Alt)));  
            disp(sprintf('Velocity=%d m/s^2',data(counter,Vel))); 
            disp(' '); 
        end %toscreen 
    end %while statement 
    counter 
%end %doitloop 
 
function [aero, laststate, oldtemps, chardepth]=aerocalcs(data, state, oldtemps, 
chardepth) 
%Last Update 4/07/04 
%Functions Called By: 
%   doit 
%Calls Functions 
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 %   Get_Density(alt) 
%   accelfunct(t, state) 
%   getMach 
%   Get_Cp0 
%Global Constants ***************************** 
global Roll Time Flt_angle Alt DynP Downrange Crossrange Vel Sensed_Acc Mach   
global Heat_Rate Shield_Tempo Shield_Tempi Tot_Heat Density Yaw Thrst Cp  
global mu Re deltaT LoD beta Rhs gravity d2r max_acc 
global Gamma Velocity Height Rt 
global ablate 
%Get_Constants; 
 
%Temp vars (for debugging)************ 
debug=0; 
%*********************************** 
%End Temp vars************************* 
 
%************************* 
    %betavar=3.7*beta/data(Cp); 
    global Rollvar 
    fltvar=data(Flt_angle)*d2r; 
    Rollvar=data(Roll)*d2r; 
    Yawvar=data(Yaw)*d2r; 
    height=Re+data(Alt); 
    %Since Altitude was defined in the matrix as height above earth, height 
    %is being used here as distance from center of earth. 
 
%************************* 
    tspan=deltaT; 
%Integrate to Find Velocity******** 
    orb_opt = odeset('RelTol',1e-8,'AbsTol',[1e-8 1e-8 1e-8 1e-8]); 
    [T,newstate]=ODE45('accelfunct', tspan, state, orb_opt); 
    last=size(newstate(:,1)); 
    last=last(1); 
    laststate=newstate(last,:); 
%Increment travelled Distance******* 
    aero(Time)=data(Time)+deltaT; 
    aero(Vel)=laststate(Velocity); 
    aero(Alt)=laststate(Height);                                            %altitude calculation 
(Spreadsheet D) 
    aero(Roll)=GetRoll(data(Roll),aero(Time)); 
    Rollvar=aero(Roll)*d2r; 
    aero(Density)=Get_Density(aero(Alt));                                      %Air Density 
(Spreadsheet N) 
    aero(Flt_angle)=laststate(Gamma)/d2r; 
%**********************   
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     if debug==1 
        disp(sprintf('Flt Path Angle (IJK) = %d degrees',aero(Flt_angle))); 
    end 
%**********************   
    %aero(Drag)=norm(Get_Drag(laststate(Velocity), aero(Density))); 
    
aero(Downrange)=data(Downrange)+deltaT*data(Vel)*cos(Yawvar)*cos(fltvar)/100
0;   %Downrange Distance Calculation (Spreadsheet F) 
    aero(Crossrange)=data(Crossrange)+data(Vel)*sin(Yawvar)*deltaT/1000;             
%Crossrange Distance Calculation (Spreadsheet G) 
    aero(Mach)=getMach(aero(Vel),aero(Alt));                                         %Mach 
Number (Spreadsheet J) 
    aero(Cp)= Get_CP0(aero(Mach));                                                   %Specific Heat 
(Spreadsheet P) 
    aero(DynP)=aero(Density)*aero(Vel)^2/2;                                          %Dynamic 
Pressure Calculation (Spreadsheet E) 
    %Heating Rate Laminar Flow on a Flat Plate, notes L&E 3/4 pg 5 
    %cos(phi)=1 sin(phi)=0   
    aero(Heat_Rate)=2*(2.568e-9)*11.3538*((aero(Density)/Rhs)^.5)*aero(Vel)^3.2;      
%kW/m^2 Heat Rate (Spreadsheet K) 
    %Ho=aero(Cp)*((-69-32)*5/9)+(aero(Vel)^2)/2 
    %Haw=aero(Cp)*((-69-32)*5/9)+.845*(aero(Vel)^2)/2 
    %m=3;    n=.5;   C=1.83e-8*Rhs^(-.5); %Conservative C, assuming Hw/Ho ~=0 
    %aero(Heat_Rate)=(aero(Density)^n*(aero(Vel))^m*C)*100^2/1000;       %Heat 
Rate in kW/m^2 
    if ablate==0 
        [aero(Shield_Tempo) aero(Shield_Tempi) oldtemps]= 
getShield5(aero(Heat_Rate), oldtemps);       %Shield Temperature (Spreadsheet L) 
    else 
        [aero(Shield_Tempo) aero(Shield_Tempi) oldtemps chardepth]= 
getShield_ablate(aero(Heat_Rate), oldtemps, chardepth);        %Shield Temperature 
(Spreadsheet L) 
    end 
    %pause %************************ 
    aero(Tot_Heat)= data(Tot_Heat)+aero(Heat_Rate)*deltaT;                       %Total 
Heat (Spreadsheet M) 
    aero(Yaw)= 
data(Yaw)+data(Density)*gravity*data(Vel)*LoD*sin(Rollvar)*deltaT/(2*beta*d2r); 
%Yaw Angle (Spreadsheet O) 
    temp1=beta/aero(Cp); 
    denstemp=gravity*aero(Density); 
    drag=aero(Density)*state(Velocity)^2/(beta/aero(Cp)); 
    gtemp=GetGravity(laststate(Height)); 
    
%aero(Sensed_Acc)=sqrt((denstemp*aero(Vel)^2/(temp1))^2+(denstemp*LoD*cos(
Rollvar)*aero(Vel)^2/(temp1))^2)/gravity; 
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     %aero(Sensed_Acc)=sqrt((gravity*drag)^2+(gravity*drag*LoD)^2)/gravity; 
    aero(Sensed_Acc)=(abs(-drag-gtemp*sin(laststate(Gamma)))/gtemp); 
    if aero(Sensed_Acc)>max_acc 
        Cd=2; 
        mass=(pi*Rhs^2*Cd/beta); 
        aero(Thrst)=(aero(Sensed_Acc)-max_acc)*mass*gravity;    %thrust in Newtons 
        aero(Sensed_Acc)=max_acc; 
    else 
        aero(Thrst)=0; 
    end %if > max_acc 
%Display for Debug**************************************** 
if debug==1 
    disp(sprintf('Time = %d seconds', aero(Time))); 
    disp(sprintf('Alt = %d meters', aero(Alt))); 
    disp(sprintf('Vel = %d m/s', aero(Vel))); 
    disp(sprintf('Acceleration = %d m/s^2', aero(Sensed_Acc))); 
    disp(sprintf('Flt Path Angle = %d degrees',aero(Flt_angle))); 
end %debug 
    %end %aerocalcs 
 
function stats=statsloop(starttraj,data) 
%March 19, 2003************************************ 
%Uses Functions********************************* 
% 
%Called By********************************* 
%   EntryMap 
%file variables****************************** 
global plotit 
global foldpath filename1 filename2 statefile savefiles 
global mu Re deltaT LoD beta Rhs gravity d2r increment 
 
    start=1; 
    finish=2; 
    %delimiter=','; 
    delimiter='\t';  
         
%Array Columns ***************************** 
global Roll Time Flt_angle Alt DynP Downrange Crossrange Vel Sensed_Acc Mach   
global Heat_Rate Shield_Tempo Shield_Tempi Tot_Heat Density Yaw Cp Thrst Lgth 
global Gamma Velocity Height Rt 
 
    maxtemp=1500; 
    loop=1; 
    temp=0; 
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     tottime=0; 
    number=1; 
epth]=size(data);     [length width d
    timecount=0; 
    oldtime=-increment; 
    startcount=0; 
    changelast=0; 
%Write to Files***********************
file=sprintf('%s.txt',filename1); 
************ 
efiles ~=0 
tarttraj,delimiter); 
limiter); 
; 
******** 
ynP)); 
******** 
 
 
op2); 
2); 
d_Acc, 
    temp
f sav    i
        dlmwrite(tempfile,s
        %dlmwrite(filename2,data,de
    end 
     
    for loop2 =(1:depth) 
         length=data(1,Lgth,loop2); 
pfile=sprintf('%s%d.txt',filename2,loop2);          tem
         if savefiles ~=0 
            %dlmwrite(tempfile,data(loop2,:,:),delimiter); 
elimiter)            dlmwrite(tempfile,data(1:length,:,loop2),d
        end 
ominal Max Q*****************    %**********Find N
        [nommaxq nommaxqindex]=max(starttraj(:,D
);         tnommaxq=starttraj(nommaxqindex,Time
nters*************    %**********Reset Cou
         overtemp=[0 0]; 
         launch_max(1,loop2)=data(1, Time, loop2); 
         launch_max(2,loop2)=data(1,Alt,loop2); 
         [high_tempo(loop2) 
high_tempo_count(loop2)]=max(data(1:length,Shield_Tempo, loop2)); 
         time_max_tempo(loop2)=data(high_tempo_count(loop2), Time, loop2);
x_tempo(loop2)=time_max_tempo(loop2)-launch_max(1,lo         pst_lnch_ma
         [high_tempi(loop2) 
high_tempi_count(loop2)]=max(data(1:length,Shield_Tempi, loop2));  
         time_max_tempi(loop2)=data(high_tempi_count(loop2), Time, loop
         subsonic=0; 
         [max_acc(loop2) max_acc_count(loop2)]=max(data(1:length,Sense
loop2)); 
         time_max_acc(loop2)=data(max_acc_count(loop2), Time, loop2); 
         thust_max_acc(loop2)=data(max_acc_count(loop2), Thrst, loop2); 
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          pst_lnch_max_acc(loop2)=time_max_acc(loop2)-launch_max(1,loop2); 
         [max_pressure(loop2) max_pressure_count(loop2)]=max(data(1:length, DynP, 
2)]=max(data(1:length,Heat_Rate, loop2));  
tf('Initial altitude %d meters in file %s', data(1,Alt,loop2), tempfile)); 
******************************* 
 
p2 > 1) &&(data(loop, Time, loop2)==0) && 
ta(loop, Shield_Tempo, loop2) > maxtemp) && 
ertemp(number, start)=data(loop, Time, loop2); 
 loop2) < maxtemp) && (overtemp(number, 
oop,Time,loop2); 
)-overtemp(number,start); 
emax)); 
rtemp(number,start); 
ber,finish); 
ds', overtemp(number, start)));  
p(sprintf(' until %d seconds', overtemp(number,finish))); 
%                 number=number+1; 
%                 overtemp(number,start)=0; 
bsonic==0) && (data(loop,Mach,loop2) < 1)) 
loop2)); 
         time_max_pressure(loop2)=data(max_pressure_count(loop2), Time, loop2); 
         [max_HeatRate(loop2) 
max_HeatRate_count(loop
         time_max_HeatRate(loop2)=data(max_HeatRate_count(loop2), Time, loop2); 
         disp(sprin
    %**************
         for loop=(1:length)
            if (loop > 1) && (loo
changelast==0 
                last=loop; 
                changelast=1; 
            end    %if statement 
%             if ((da
(overtemp(number,finish) ~= 1)) 
%                 ov
%                 overtemp(number, finish)=1; 
%             end; 
%             if ((data(loop, Shield_Tempo,
finish) == 1)) 
%                 overtemp(number, finish)=data(l
%                 timemax=overtemp(number,finish
%                 tottime=tottime+timemax; 
%                 disp(sprintf('Time spent over maximum temperature %d', tim
%                 time1=ove
%                 time2=overtemp(num
%                 disp(sprintf('From %d secon
%                 dis
%                 disp('   '); 
%             end; 
%             if ((su
%                 subsonic(loop2)=loop; 
%             end; 
        end; %loop (length) 
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    end; %loop2 (depth) 
 
%Plots ***************************************************** 
save test.mat starttraj data %max_pressure max_acc high_temp 
fignum=1; 
 if plotit==1 
    n=3; 
    figure(fignum) 
starttraj(:,Time), starttraj(:,Alt),'k');     subplot(n,1,1),plot(
    title('Initial Trajectory: Altitude vs Time'); 
    %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
)');     ylabel('Altitude (m
    subplot(n,1,2),plot(starttraj(:,Time), starttraj(:,Sensed_Acc),'k'); 
aj(:,Time), starttraj(:,Roll),'k'); 
%d',foldpath,fignum); 
 
%      ylabel('Q (Pa)'); 
1)); 
%     xlabel('trial number'); 
    ylabel('Acc (g"s)'); 
tarttr    subplot(n,1,3),plot(s
    ylabel('Roll (deg)'); 
    xlabel('Time (s)'); 
%     tempfile=sprintf('%sfig
file  %     print -djpeg temp
=fignum+1;     fignum
%**************************
%      plot(max_pressure); 
%      xlabel('trial number'); 
     n=5; 
%     subplot(n,1,1),plot(temp
%     ylabel('Initial Alt (m)'); 
    figure(fignum) 
    subplot(n,1,1),plot(max_pressure,'ro'); 
tle('Hashest Conditions per Run'); 
    subplot(n,1,2),plot(max_acc,'ro'); 
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
    ylabel('Acceleration (g s)'); 
     
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
label('Q (Pa)'); 
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    y
    ti
     %figure(3) 
    subplot(n,1,3),plot(high_tempo,'ro'); 
%sfig%d.fig',foldpath,fignum); 
file  
    fignum=fignum+1; 
%*******************************    
,:); 
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
   ylabel('Outer Temp (C)');  
     
h_tempi,'ro');     subplot(n,1,4),plot(hig
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
   ylabel('Inner Temp (C)');  
 
eatRate,'ro');     subplot(n,1,5),plot(max_H
    xlabel('trial number'); 
    ylabel('Heat Rate (kW/m^2)'); 
 
%     tempfile=sprintf('
%     print -djpeg temp
    n=5; 
    temp=data(1,Alt
    last=size(max_acc); 
    figure(fignum) 
    subplot(n,1,1),plot(max_acc,'ro'); 
s'); 
,1:last,tnommaxq,'*'); 
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
)');     ylabel('Acceleration (g s
on    title('Worst Accelerati
     
    %figure(2) 
_max_acc,'ro');     subplot(n,1,2),plot(thust
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
label('Thrust (g s)');     y
     
ax_acc,'ro'); %    subplot(n,1,3),plot(time_m
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
label('Time of Max Acc (s)');     y
     
nch_max,'ro'); %     subplot(n,1,4),plot(lau
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 %     %xlabel('trial number'); 
%     ylabel('Time of Lifeboat Launch (s)'); 
lnch_max_acc,'ro'); 
  ylabel('Post Ejection Time Max Acc (s)'); 
('trial number'); 
ction (m)'); 
*********    
    n=4; 
    figure(fignum) 
po,'ro'); 
     
    subplot(n,1,4),plot(pst_
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
  
 
    subplot(n,1,5),plot(launch_max(2,:),'ro'); 
    xlabel
    ylabel('Altitdue at Eje
 
    fignum=fignum+1; 
%**********************
    subplot(n,1,1),plot(high_tem
xlabel('trial number');     %
    ylabel('Outer Temp (C)'); 
    title('Worst Temperature'); 
     
    subplot(n,1,2),plot(time_max_tempo,'ro'); %,1:last,tnommaxq,'*'); 
label('Time of Max Outer Temp (s)'); 
nch_max,'ro'); 
  ylabel('Time of Lifeboat Launch (s)'); 
lnch_max_tempo,'ro'); 
  ylabel('Post Ejection Time Max Temp (s)'); 
  subplot(n,1,4),plot(launch_max(2,:),'ro'); 
)'); 
m+1; 
%*******************************   
%xtext='Post Escape Time (s)'; 
e (s)'; 
figure(fignum) 
   length=max(data(1,Lgth,:)); 
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
    y
     
%     subplot(n,1,3),plot(lau
%     xlabel('trial number'); 
%   
     
    subplot(n,1,3),plot(pst_
    %xlabel('trial number'); 
  
     
  
    xlabel('trial number'); 
    ylabel('Altitdue at Ejection (m
 
    fignum=fignu
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xtext='Post Nominal Launch Tim
    temp1=[data(1:length,Alt,1)]; 
   for loop=1:depth 
%        for loop2=1:data(1,Lgth,loop) 
ta(1,Time,loop); 
       temp2(loop)=data(1,Time,loop); 
%            data(loop2,Time,loop)=data(loop2,Time,loop)-da
%        end 
       %temp2(loop)=data(1,Time,loop)-launch_max(loop); 
       temp3(:,loop)=data(:,Shield_Tempo,loop); 
    end 
   mesh(temp2, temp1, temp3); 
    xlabel(xtext); 
);     ylabel('Altitude (m)'
    zlabel('Outer Shield Temperature (C)'); 
eld Temperature Contour Plot')    title('Outer Shi ; 
fig',foldpath,fignum); 
lt,1)]; 
    zlabel('Inner Shield Temperature (C)'); 
    title('Inner Shield Temperature Contour Plot'); 
,fignum); 
    colorbar; 
%     tempfile=sprintf('%sfig%d.
pfile  %     print -djpeg tem
    fignum=fignum+1; 
******************************     %****
   figure(fignum) 
ta(1,Lgth,:));    length=max(da
   temp1=[data(1:length,A
   for loop=1:depth 
        temp3(:,loop)=data(:,Shield_Tempi,loop); 
    end 
   mesh(temp2, temp1, temp3); 
    xlabel(xtext); 
    ylabel('Altitude (m)'); 
    colorbar; 
%     tempfile=sprintf('%sfig%d.fig',foldpath
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 %     print -djpeg tempfile  
    fignum=fignum+1; 
%*******************************    
figure(fignum) 
   for loop=1:depth 
        temp3(:,loop)=data(:,Sensed_Acc,loop); 
    end 
    mesh(temp2, temp1, temp3); 
    ylabel('Initial Altitude (m)'); 
    xlabel(xtext); 
    zlabel('Acceleration (g"s)');  
    title('Acceleration Contour Plot'); 
    colorbar; 
%     tempfile=sprintf('%sfig%d.fig',foldpath,fignum
%     print -djpeg tempfile  
); 
*************  
); 
  color
fig%d.fig',foldpath,fignum); 
e  
******************************* 
       n=4; 
       
'c ' 'm '];% 'ro' 'y*']; 
************************ 
        subplot(n,1,1),plot(starttraj(:,Time),starttraj(:,Alt),'k'); 
    fignum=fignum+1; 
%*************************
   figure(fignum) 
   for loop=1:depth 
        temp3(:,loop)=data(:,Thrst,loop
    end 
    mesh(temp2, temp1, temp3); 
    ylabel('Initial Altitude (m)'); 
    xlabel(xtext); 
    zlabel('Thrust (g)');  
    title('Acceleration Contour Plot'); 
  bar; 
%     tempfile=sprintf('%s
%     print -djpeg tempfil
    fignum=fignum+1; 
%*******
 
 if (depth < 6) 
       fignum=fignum+1; 
       figure(fignum) 
       colors=['r ' 'y ' 'g ' 'b ' 
       hold on %*******
        %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
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         ylabel('Alt (m)'); 
        title('Simulation Results with Mock Baseline Trajectory') 
****************   
ed_Acc),'k'); 
g s)'); 
***************** 
ld_Tempo),'k'); 
***************** 
:,Time),starttraj(:,DynP),'k'); 
******************** 
g s)'); 
(n,1,3),plot(data(1:lnght,Time,loop),data(1:lnght,Shield_Tempo,loop),colors(l
; 
****************************       
        hold on %***************
        subplot(n,1,2),plot(starttraj(:,Time),starttraj(:,Sens
        %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
        ylabel('Acceleration (
        hold on %**************
        subplot(n,1,3),plot(starttraj(:,Time),starttraj(:,Shie
        %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
ure (C)');         ylabel('Temperat
        hold on %**************
bplot(n,1,4),plot(starttraj(        su
        %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
        ylabel('Q (Pa)'); 
***       hold on %********
       for loop=1:depth 
lnght=data(1,Lgth,loop);            
           
subplot(n,1,1),plot(data(1:lnght,Time,loop),data(1:lnght,Alt,loop),colors(loop)); 
           %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
           ylabel('Alt (m)'); 
           hold on %******************************* 
           
subplot(n,1,2),plot(data(1:lnght,Time,loop),data(1:lnght,Sensed_Acc,loop),colors(loo
p)); 
           %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
 (           ylabel('Acceleration
           hold on %******************************* 
           
subplot
oop)); 
           %xlabel('Time (s)'); 
           ylabel('Temp (C)')
           hold on %***
           
subplot(n,1,4),plot(data(1:lnght,Time,loop),data(1:lnght,DynP,loop),colors(loop)); 
 
         tempfile=sprintf('%sfig%d.fig',foldpath,fignum); 
           xlabel('Time (s)'); 
           ylabel('Q (Pa)');   
        end %subplots 
        hold off
%
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 %         print -djpeg tempfile  
        fignum=fignum+1; 
 
nd %Plots 
 end %if
e
 
    stats=depth; 
 
%end %stats2 
 
function density=Get_Density(alt); 
 1/6/05 
 Air Density 
m scale ht, m 
ea level 
ht; %***************************** 
      denscount=denscount+1; 
)=density; 
ensity 
%Last Update
% 
%Given altitude above Earth returns
% 
%Functions Called By: 
%   aerocalcs 
%   accelfunct 
global track_dens denscount ndens 
 
    H=7128.1;       %at
    rho0=1.478;     %atm. dens, s
    scale_ht=exp(-alt/H); 
    %alt 
    density=rho0*scale_
    if track_dens==1  
  
        ndens(denscount,1)=alt; 
        ndens(denscount,2
    end %track_dens   
    %end Get_D
 
function statedot=accelfunct(t, state) 
(alt) 
********************** 
************************* 
%Last Update 2/24/04 
%Functions Called By: 
%   aerocalcs 
%Calls Functions 
%   Get_Density
%   GetGravity 
%Globals****
global mu Re LoD d2r beta; 
global Velocity Gamma Height Rt 
global Rollvar 
 
countdrag=1; 
%*********
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     density=Get_Density(state(Height)); 
    g=GetGravity(state(Height)); 
t); 
state(Velocity)^2/(beta/Cp0); 
/Cp0)) 
)/alt)*cos(state(gamma)-
lift-(1-
c)^2)*g*cos(state(Gamma)))*cos(Rollvar)/state(Velocity); 
  statedot(Velocity)=-drag-g*sin(state(Gamma)); 
)=state(Velocity)*sin(state(Gamma)); 
ccelfunct 
    alt=state(Height)+Re; 
    vcirc=sqrt(mu/al
    %drag=0; 
    mach=getMach(state(Velocity), alt); 
    Cp0=Get_Cp0(mach); 
    drag=density*
    lift=drag*LoD; 
    %gdot=((G/Velocity-Velocity/(Re+Alt))*COS(Gamma*d2r)-
G*Density*Velocity*LD*COS(Roll*d2r)/(3.7*beta
    %statedot(Gamma)=((g/state(Velocity)-state(Velocity
g*lift*cos(roll) 
    statedot(Gamma)=(
(state(Velocity)/vcir
  
    statedot(Height
    statedot(Rt)=state(Velocity)*cos(state(Gamma)); 
    statedot=statedot'; 
%end %a
 
%September 26, 
***************************************** 
e) 
er=0; 
undvel(counter,alt)=loop; 
000 
undvel(counter,alt)=loop; 
t 
; 
2003************
function mach=getMach(Vel, Altitud
    alt=1; 
    speed=2; 
    count
    maxalt=100000; 
    for loop=0:500:3000; 
        counter=counter+1; 
        so
    end; 
    for loop=4000:1000:20
        counter=counter+1; 
        so
    end 
    for loop=25000:5000:maxal
        counter=counter+1; 
        soundvel(counter,alt)=loop
    end 
    soundvel(1,speed)=340.294; 
    soundvel(2,speed)=338.37; 
    soundvel(3,speed)=336.435; 
    soundvel(4,speed)=334.489; 
    soundvel(5,speed)=332.532; 
    soundvel(6,speed)=330.563; 
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     soundvel(7,speed)=328.583; 
    soundvel(8,speed)=324.589; 
    soundvel(9,speed)=320.545; 
    soundvel(10,speed)=316.452; 
    soundvel(11,speed)=312.306; 
    soundvel(12,speed)=308.105; 
    soundvel(13,speed)=303.848; 
    soundvel(14,speed)=299.532; 
    soundvel(15,speed)=298.638; 
    soundvel(16,speed)=297.745; 
    soundvel(17,speed)=296.851; 
    soundvel(18,speed)=295.958; 
    soundvel(19,speed)=295.069; 
    soundvel(20,speed)=294.466; 
    soundvel(21,speed)=294.148; 
    soundvel(22,speed)=294.452; 
    soundvel(23,speed)=294.726; 
    soundvel(24,speed)=295.069; 
    soundvel(25,speed)=298.389; 
    soundvel(26,speed)=301.709; 
    soundvel(27,speed)=309.449; 
    soundvel(28,speed)=317.189; 
    soundvel(29,speed)=323.494; 
    soundvel(30,speed)=329.799; 
 
 
 
 
undvel(36,speed)=269.44; 
288.88; 
08.31; 
dvel(39,speed)=327.75; 
 
ound=interp1(soundvel(:,alt),soundvel(:,speed),Altitude); 
alt)); 
 
        fprintf('%15.6f', soundvel(loop,:)); 
   end 
Mach 
    soundvel(31,speed)=325.203;
    soundvel(32,speed)=320.606;
    soundvel(33,speed)=308.873;
    soundvel(34,speed)=297.139;
    soundvel(35,speed)=283.29; 
    so
    soundvel(37,speed)=
    soundvel(38,speed)=3
    soun
    soundvel(40,speed)=347.18; 
     
    if Altitude > maxalt
        Altitude = maxalt; 
    end 
    speeds
%    temp=size(soundvel(:,
%    for loop=1:temp
%
%        fprintf('\n'); 
%
    mach=Vel/speedsound; 
    %end %get
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function Cp=Get_Cp0(mach) 
 
    Cp=1.35-(atan(1.96*(1-mach)))/pi; 
%end %CP0 
 
function density=Get_Density(alt); 
 1/6/05 
 Air Density 
 
ack_dens denscount ndens 
m scale ht, m 
ea level 
_ht; %***************************** 
      denscount=denscount+1; 
)=density; 
ensity 
%Last Update
% 
%Given altitude above Earth returns
%
%Functions Called By: 
%   aerocalcs 
%   accelfunct 
global tr
 
    H=7128.1;       %at
    rho0=1.478;     %atm. dens, s
    scale_ht=exp(-alt/H); 
    %alt 
    density=rho0*scale
    if track_dens==1  
  
        ndens(denscount,1)=alt; 
        ndens(denscount,2
    end %track_dens   
    %end Get_D
 
function drag=Get_Drag(v, density) 
 By: 
accelfunct 
drag dragcount 
  global Velocity 
et Drag 
%Last Update 1/12/04 
%Functions Called
%   
 
    global beta Re 
    global track_drag n
  
     
    earthrate=7.292115e-5; 
    drag=.5*density*v^2; 
    %end %G
 
function [kappav, kappac, cvv, cvc]=Get_Kappas(temp) 
oefficients of an ablative substance and the 
temperature will find the thermal conductivity of both charred and virgin 
%Given the thermal c
%
%material 
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minchar=37.96; 
.1833; 
2 857.72]; 
71.52 857.72]; 
 857.72]; 
2 857.72]; 
appas(10,:)=[976.85 nan 0.083739869 nan 1158.968]; 
02805643 nan 1204.992]; 
.627778 nan 0.121497578 nan 1213.36]; 
  
as(15,:)=[1671.294444 nan 0.201872899 nan 1213.36]; 
=kappas(:,2:5)/1000; 
p < maxvirg 
kappas(:,temperature),kappas(:,virgval),temp); 
ppav=nan; 
 temp > minchar 
perature),kappas(:,charval),temp); 
,temperature),kappas(:,cheatcap),temp); 
 
maxvirg=560
 
temperature=1; 
virgval=2; 
charval=3; 
vheatcap=4; 
cheatcap=5; 
 
kappas(1,:)=[-100.928 .02130881 nan 1171.52 nan]; 
kappas(2,:)=[-17.59444444 0.02878558 nan 1171.52 nan]; 
kappas(3,:)=[37.96111111 0.033645483 0.059814192 1171.5
kappas(4,:)=[143.5166667 0.042991451 0.059814192 11
kappas(5,:)=[171.2944444 0.046729838 0.059814192 1171.52
kappas(6,:)=[282.4055556 0.046729838 0.059814192 1171.5
kappas(7,:)=[560.1833333 nan 0.059814192 nan 857.72]; 
kappas(8,:)=[699.0722222 nan 0.065421773 nan 1096.208]; 
kappas(9,:)=[837.9611111 nan 0.072898547 nan 1138.048]; 
k
kappas(11,:)=[1185.183333 nan 0.1
kappas(12,:)=[1254
kappas(13,:)=[1393.516667 nan 0.142058706 nan 1213.36]; 
kappas(14,:)=[1532.405556 nan 0.177573383 nan 1213.36]; 
kapp
 
kappas(:,2:5)
if tem
    kappav=interp1(
    cvv=interp1(kappas(:,temperature),kappas(:,vheatcap),temp); 
else 
    ka
    cvv=nan; 
end 
if
    kappac=interp1(kappas(:,tem
    cvc=interp1(kappas(:
else 
    kappac=nan;
end 
 
function g=GetGravity(height) 
Calls Functions 
%Last Update 2/24/04 
%Functions Called By: 
%   accelfunct 
%
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 %Globals************************** 
bal gravity Re 
*********** 
ht+Re)^2); 
glo
%***********************
g=gravity*(Re^2)/((heig
%end GetGravity 
 
function roll=GetRoll(oldroll, time) 
nction roll=GetRoll(time) 
lled By: 
3392; 
00; 
(time/tou))^1';*******     
roll)-90)< 1) && (rem(Rollcount,50)~=0)) 
=Rollcount+1; 
         roll=oldroll; 
); 
% 
%fu
%Last Update 4/14/04 
%Functions Ca
%   aerocalcs 
 
    global rolleqtn Rollcount 
     
    tou=174.33647887
    %tou=1
% ****** rolleqtn='90*(sin
 
%      if ((abs(abs(old
%         Rollcount
%
%     else 
%         roll=eval(rolleqtn); 
%     end %if statement 
roll=eval(rolleqtn
%end %GetRoll 
 
%September 26 2003********************************************** 
 shieldtemp=getShield(heatrate) 
000 * heatrate/2)^.25)-460; 
    if temp < 60  
        shieldtemp=60; 
    else 
        shieldtemp=temp; 
    end  
    %end%shieldtemp
function
    temp=((229100580
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 Glossary 
 
ACES Advanced Crew Escape Suit 
AMROC American Rocket Company  
AOA Abort Once Around 
ATO Abort To Orbit 
CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
deltaT Simulation Time Interval 
EI Entry Interface 
GPC General Purpose Computer 
h Altitude 
L/D Lift to Drag Ratio 
LAS Launch Abort System 
LES Launch Escape System 
LES  Launch and Entry Suit 
max q Maximum Dynamic Pressure 
MECO Main Engine Cut Off 
MOOSE Manned Orbital Operations Safety Equipment 
OAMS Orbital Attitude Maneuvering System 
OMS  Orbital Maneuvering System 
PEAP Personel Egress Air Pack 
RCS  Reentry Control System 
RTSL Return to Launch Site 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
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 TAL Transatlantic Abort Landing 
US  United States 
v Velocity 
γ Flight Path Angle 
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